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Abstract 
We assess the impact of the Eurosystem’s Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operations 
(TLTROs) on the lending policies of euro area banks. To guide our empirical research, we build
a theoretical model in which banks compete à la Cournot in the credit and deposit markets. 
According to the model, we distinguish between direct and indirect effects. Direct effects take
place because bidding banks expand their loan supply due to the lower marginal costs
implied by the TLTROs. Indirect effects on non-bidders operate via changes in the competitive 
environment in banks’ credit and deposit markets and are a priori ambiguous. We then test
these theoretical predictions with a sample of 130 banks from 13 countries and the
confidential answers to the ECB’s Bank Lending Survey. Regarding direct effects on bidders, 
we find an easing impact on margins on loans to relatively safe borrowers, but no impact on 
credit standards. Regarding indirect effects, there is a positive impact on the loan supply
on non-bidders but, contrary to the direct effects, the transmission of the TLTROs takes place 
through an easing of credit standards, and it is mainly concentrated in banks facing high
competitive pressures. We also find evidence of positive funding externalities. 
 
Keywords: unconventional monetary policy, TLTROs, lending policies, competition. 
JEL Classification: G21, E52, E58. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
El presente artículo evalúa el impacto de las operaciones de refinanciación a largo plazo con 
objetivo específico (TLTRO, por sus siglas en inglés) en las políticas crediticias de los bancos 
del área del euro. Para guiar la investigación empírica, construimos un modelo teórico en el 
que los bancos compiten a la Cournot en los mercados de crédito y depósito. Distinguimos 
entre efectos directos y efectos indirectos. Los efectos directos ocurren porque los bancos 
que participan en las TLTRO expanden su oferta de crédito gracias a los menores costes 
marginales que conllevan estas operaciones. Los efectos indirectos en los bancos que no 
participan operan a través de cambios en la estructura competitiva de los mercados de 
crédito y depósito, y su efecto es ambiguo a priori. Tras este análisis, examinamos estas 
predicciones teóricas con una muestra de 130 bancos de 13 países y las respuestas 
confidenciales a la Encuesta de Préstamos Bancarios del Banco Central Europeo. Respecto 
a los efectos directos, encontramos que las TLTRO contribuyeron a reducir los márgenes 
sobre préstamos relativamente seguros, pero que no tuvieron impacto en los criterios de 
aprobación de préstamos. Respecto a los efectos indirectos, la transmisión de las TLTRO 
tuvo lugar a través de la relajación de los criterios de aprobación de préstamos, y estuvo 
concentrada principalmente en los bancos expuestos a altas presiones competitivas. 
También hallamos evidencia de externalidades positivas en los mercados de financiación. 
Palabras clave: política monetaria no convencional, TLTRO, políticas crediticias, competencia. 
Códigos JEL: G21, E52, E58. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, central banks around the world have undertaken 
numerous unconventional monetary policies to prevent a credit crunch, stimulate aggregate 
demand and boost inflation. In the euro area these included the provision of liquidity using 
fixed-rate full-allotment tenders, a lengthening of the maturity of central bank credit operations, 
a wider set of eligible collateral, large scale purchase programmes of public and private sector 
assets, negative interest rates and forward guidance.  
The goal of this paper is to assess the impact of the Eurosystem’s Targeted Long-Term 
Refinancing Operations (TLTROs) on the lending policies of euro area banks. The TLTROs are 
liquidity providing central bank operations with maturity of up to four years. They were 
announced in June 2014 in a context of slow economic growth, weak inflation outlook and 
subdued monetary and credit dynamics in the euro area. Unlike their predecessors (VLTROs1), 
the TLTROs explicitly targeted lending to the real economy and were designed to reduce the 
incentives to banks to use the liquidity for sovereign debt purchases. Our analysis aims to 
capture both the direct impact of the measure on the lending policies of banks which accessed 
the TLTROs and the indirect effects, as the remaining banks react strategically to the change in the 
behaviour of TLTRO bidders. Such indirect effects operate via changes in the competitive 
environment in banks’ credit and funding markets. Their inclusion as object for analysis is a 
distinct feature of this study. 
To guide our empirical research, we first present a simple extension of the Monti-Klein 
model of oligopolistic competition in the banking sector. For the sake of simplicity, we consider 
only two banks, a safe and a risky bank, which compete à la Cournot in the loan and deposit 
markets. The main departure from the standard model is the introduction of a funding 
impairment: one of the banks is perceived to be risky, resulting in higher funding costs. 
Importantly, it also leads to an asymmetric recourse to the TLTROs and allows us to study the 
direct impact of the measure on the risky bank, which borrows from the central bank, and  
the indirect impact on its competitor, the safe bank.  
This asymmetric recourse arises as the TLTROs borrowing costs are higher than the 
deposit funding costs of the safe bank but attractive for its risky competitor. After the 
introduction of the measure the risky bank can fund part of its loan portfolio with the TLTROs 
rather than with more costly deposits. The introduction of the TLTROs has both direct effects 
on the bidding bank (the risky bank) and indirect effects on the non-bidder (the safe bank). 
Regarding direct effects, the funding cost relief due to the TLTROs leads to an expansion of the 
loan supply by the risky bank. With respect to indirect effects, we must differentiate between 
two opposite forces. On the one hand, competition in the credit market becomes stronger. The 
TLTROs, by reducing the risky bank’s marginal funding costs, allow it to compete more 
aggressively in the loan market. As banks compete à la Cournot, loan quantities are strategic 
substitutes, implying that an expansion in the credit supply of the risky bank leads to a 
contraction in the credit supply of the safe bank. On the other hand, competition in the deposit 
market weakens because the risky bank substitutes some deposits with TLTRO funding. The 
lower demand for deposits leads to lower deposit rates, which translate into lower marginal 
                                                                            
1 Longer-term refinancing operations with a three year maturity implemented in December 2011 and February 2012. The 
abbreviations “VLTROs” stands for very long-term refinancing operations. 
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costs also for the safe bank. Ceteris paribus, its loan supply expands. Hence, the overall 
indirect impact of the TLTROs is a priori ambiguous and must be assessed empirically. 
The empirical analysis measures bank lending policies with credit standards (i.e., the 
internal guidelines or loan approval criteria of a bank) and loan margins (i.e., the agreed spread 
over the relevant reference rate), as reported by banks in the ECB’s Bank Lending Survey 
(BLS). Several papers in the literature, such as Lown and Morgan (2006), and Ciccarelli et al. 
(2015), identify credit standards as reported in lending surveys as proxies for credit supply. We 
use the confidential answers by 130 banks from 13 euro area countries, matched with 
individual bank balance-sheet information and operations data. 
The empirical identification of the causal impact of the TLTROs on bank lending 
policies needs to address two major issues. First, banks participated in the TLTROs on a 
voluntary basis and thus selection into treatment is non-random. To obtain consistent 
estimates we construct an instrumental variable for the TLTRO uptake. The proposed 
instrumental variable comes from the institutional setting of the TLTROs, as in Benetton and 
Fantino (2017). In particular, we exploit an allocation rule by the policy, according to which 
banks could borrow an amount equivalent to 7% of their eligible loans outstanding on 30 April 
2014. Crucially, the stock of eligible loans was measured at a date prior to the announcement 
of the policy (June 2014). The initial allowance constitutes an exogenous component of the 
TLTRO uptakes, as it is based on exogenous parameters that are common across banks and 
on pre-determined bank balance sheet characteristics. The relevance of our instrument is 
ensured by the fact that in the first two TLTROs 80% of the participating banks borrowed at 
least 90% of their initial allowance (Figure 1).  
Second, credit supply must be disentangled from credit demand.2 For instance, banks 
with high TLTRO uptakes may face more dynamic demand conditions or deal with more 
creditworthy borrowers, which may induce them to ease credit standards or narrow margins. 
To control for demand factors, we include a large vector of control variables that measure the 
evolution of credit demand by firms and households in different segments (e.g. loans to SMEs), 
as well as the factors underlying those developments (e.g., consumer confidence), as reported 
by banks in the BLS. 
Our results suggest strong indirect effects of the TLTROs on credit standards, but no 
significant impact on margins on safe loans. In the case of loans to non-financial corporations, 
a standard deviation increase in the TLTRO uptakes of a bank’s competitors leads to a 5.3 pp 
increase in the probability that it eases overall credit standards. The impact on credit to large 
firms is even stronger, resulting in an 8.8 pp increase in the probability of easing credit 
standards. In the case of loans to households for house purchase, a standard deviation 
increase in the TLTRO uptakes of a bank’s competitors implies an 8.8 pp increase in the 
probability that the bank eases its own credit standards. These effects are concentrated in 
banks with low market share that face high competitive pressures, suggesting that competition 
in the credit market plays a crucial role. By contrast, the TLTRO uptakes of a bank’s 
competitors have no significant effect on margins on average loans in either segment. We also 
find some evidence that the TLTROs do not lead to excessive risk taking, as TLTRO uptakes 
                                                                            
2 While the BLS aims to distinguish between supply (measured by credit standards and loan margins) and demand, note 
that some of the factors underlying the changes in credit standards and loan margins have a demand component. 
According to the survey, credit standards and loan margins are determined by cost of funds and balance sheet 
constraints, pressure from competition, bank’s risk tolerance and perception of risk. The last factor comprises the sub-
factors “general economic situation”, “industry or firm-specific situation” and “risk related to the collateral demanded”. 
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are negatively correlated with the probability of narrowing margins on riskier loans. All in all, the 
results suggest that the TLTROs generate positive funding externalities on non-bidders. 
Regarding direct effects, the transmission of monetary policy takes place mainly 
through the adjustment of margins on loans to relatively safe borrowers. The effects are 
stronger in the subsample of bidding banks (i.e., the intensive margin of monetary policy pass-
through) than in the comparison between bidders and non-bidders (i.e., the extensive margin). 
In particular, for the subsample of bidding banks, a standard deviation increase in a bank’s 
TLTRO uptake increases the probability of narrowing margins on average loans to firms by 20 pp 
and raises the probability of narrowing margins on average loans to households for house 
purchase by 28.6 pp. With respect to the extensive margin, bidding banks are much more 
likely (62 pp) to narrow margins on average loans than non-bidders in the case of housing 
loans, while there are no significant differences between the two groups in the segment of 
corporate loans.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the most relevant 
literature on the subject and discusses our key contributions. Section 3 describes the institutional 
background of the TLTROs. Section 4 presents a simple theoretical model to guide our empirical 
analysis. Section 5 discusses the identification strategy in detail. Section 6 explains the data 
sources and the variables employed in the empirical analyses. Section 7 comments on the main 
results. Section 8 explains some robustness tests. Section 9 concludes. 
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2 Related Literature and contribution 
Our paper belongs to the broad and by now mature literature on the effects of monetary policy 
on bank credit supply, the so-called bank lending channel. It belongs to the set of empirical 
studies focusing on the impact on unconventional monetary policies. The analysis is most 
closely related to the branch of the literature analysing the impact of large scale liquidity 
injections via central bank credit operations, as introduced for instance by the ECB and Fed in 
the course of the financial crisis.3 Many of the papers using euro area data focus on the two 
longer-term refinancing operations with a 3 year maturity (often labelled ‘VLTROs’ or 
‘3yLTROs’) of 2011-2012, in which an unprecedented overall amount of around one trillion 
euros were allotted to banks in the euro area.  
As regards analysis using aggregate data, Darracq-Paries and De Santis (2015) use 
information on credit supply conditions from the ECB's Bank Lending Survey (BLS) to identify 
the credit supply shock implied by the VLTROs in a panel-VAR for euro area countries. Their 
counterfactual experiments point to a relevant increase in bank loans to non-financial 
corporations and a moderate narrowing of lending rate spreads, together with a significant 
increase in the euro area real GDP. Casiraghi et al. (2016) use bank-level data and the 
individual answers of the Italian banks to the BLS, together with the Bank of Italy model of the 
Italian economy, to assess the effectiveness of the ECB's Securities Markets Programme 
(SMP), the VLTROs and the Outright Monetary Operations (OMT). They find that the VLTROs 
had a significant impact on credit supply, mainly through a sizeable reduction in the interest 
rates paid by Italian banks in the interbank market. They also find that the overall impact of the 
three policies on GDP growth, mainly via the credit channel, was a cumulative increase of 2.7 pp. 
over the period 2012–2013. A different approach consists of exploiting very granular data 
coming from credit registers to identify shifts in credit supply using the Khawja and Mian (2008) 
methodology. Andrade et al. (2015), in their study of the French banking system, find that the 
VLTROs had a positive and sizeable impact on the provision of credit to firms. The opportunity 
to replace outstanding short-term by longer-term central bank funding (as banks rolled over 
their existing borrowings from the Eurosystem into the VLTROs) enhanced this transmission. 
Similarly, Jasova et al. (2018), in their analysis of the Portuguese case, show that the extension 
of bank debt maturity caused by the VLTROs had a positive and sizeable impact on bank 
lending to the real economy thanks to the reduction in rollover risk. Garcia-Posada and 
Marchetti (2016), find that the VLTROs had a positive moderate-sized effect on the supply of 
bank credit to Spanish firms. The effect was greater for illiquid banks and that it was driven by 
credit to SMEs, as there was no impact on loans to large firms. Carpinelli and Crosignani 
(2017), for the case of Italy, show that banks that experienced a wholesale market dry-up 
before the intervention reduced their credit supply during the period of funding stress and 
restored their credit supply once the central bank injected liquidity into the system, partly due 
to a regulatory change that expanded eligible collateral.4  
                                                                            
3 Examples of injections of liquidity via central bank credit operations by the Eurosystem include the liquidity-providing 
longer-term refinancing operations with a one year maturity announced in May 2009, the longer-term refinancing 
operations with a 3 year maturity announced in December 2011 and the two series of TLTROs, announced in June 
2014 and in March 2016. The liquidity providing credit operations introduced by the Fed include the Primary Dealer 
Credit Facility, the Term Auction Facility, Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity 
Facility, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility. 
4 The Italian government offered banks the possibility to obtain a government guarantee on securities otherwise ineligible 
as collateral against a fee.  
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While the above evidence suggests that the VLTROs were effective in preventing a 
credit crunch in the euro area, there is also ample evidence that banks used part of the liquidity 
to purchase high-yield government bonds and engage in carry trade strategies (Acharya and 
Steffen (2015), Carpinelli and Crosignani (2017), Crosignani et al (2017), Jasova et al. (2018)), 
which reinforced the sovereign-bank nexus. Consistent with these findings, Van der Kwaak 
(2017) builds a DSGE model in which the provision of central bank liquidity, for which 
commercial banks pledge collateral in the form of government bonds, induces banks to shift 
from private credit to government bonds, and finds that the cumulative effect on output is zero. 
Similarly, the model of Corbisiero (2018) shows that the sovereign-bank nexus can impair a 
proper monetary transmission mechanism in the euro area, because in times of high sovereign 
yields central bank liquidity injections can lead banks in stressed countries to increase their 
domestic sovereign holdings, rather than channelling funds to the real economy. 
As a response to those criticisms, the TLTROs explicitly target lending to the real 
economy. The literature on the topic is still scarce. Balfoussia and Gibson (2016) analyse the 
potential impact of the TLTROs on the real economic activity of the euro area within a VAR 
framework. Their results suggest a significant impact of the TLTROs on economic growth via 
an easing of financial conditions. Andreeva (2018) studies the impact of the TLTROs on bank 
lending rates and volumes in a difference-in-differences framework. She finds that the TLTROs 
successfully boosted the supply of eligible bank loans with limited spillover effects on not 
targeted ones. Benetton and Fantino (2017) use the Italian credit register to analyse the pass-
through of the TLTROs to the cost of credit to Italian firms. As in our paper, they use the initial 
borrowing allowance as an instrument for the endogenous take-up in the TLTROs in a diff-in-
diff framework. They find that banks participating in the TLTROs decrease their rates by 20 
basis points relative to non-participating banks. Crucially, the pass-through of the TLTROs 
depends on the competition in local credit markets, as proxied by the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI): a firm in a province with a standard deviation higher level of concentration 
experiences almost no decrease in the rates as a result of the liquidity injection.  
Our paper, while sharing some similarities with Benetton and Fantino (2017), it 
possesses some distinctive features. First, we analyse both the direct and the indirect channel 
of the transmission of the TLTROs to the banking sector. Previous literature has focused on the 
direct channel (the direct impact of a bank’s participation in the programme on its own credit 
supply) and has ignored the indirect channel (the impact of the participation of a bank’s 
competitors on the bank’s credit supply via changes in the competitive environment). Second, 
we analyse the impact of the TLTROs on both bank credit standards and margins. Confidential 
survey data allows us to study lending standards, a variable that is not directly observed in 
credit registers.5 A related analysis using banks’ individual responses in the BLS to assess the 
impact of the APP and negative interest rates can be found in Altavilla et al. (2018). Third, we 
analyse both loans to firms and households, while previous literature has exclusively studied the 
former. Finally, we analyse the transmission of unconventional monetary policy in 13 euro area 
countries, while the papers that rely on credit registers only study the effect on a single country. 
                                                                            
5 This does not mean that the evolution of credit standards cannot be studied using hard data. See, for instance, 
Rodano et al. (2017). 
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3 Institutional framework 
On the 5th of June 2014, the ECB decided to support bank lending to the euro area 
nonfinancial private sector through a first set of Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations 
(TLTRO I).6 This policy was implemented through eight auctions, one each quarter from 
September 2014 to June 2016, and participation was open to institutions that were eligible for 
the Eurosystem open market operations. In addition, a second series of four operations 
(TLTRO II) were announced on the 10th of March 20167 and conducted between June 2016 
and March 2017 at a quarterly frequency. This paper focuses on the effect of TLTRO I on 
banks’ lending policies, as measured via credit standards and margins.  
All 8 TLTROs-I mature in September 2018, although early voluntary repayments can 
be done starting 24 months after each TLTRO. The interest rate on the TLTROs is fixed over 
the life of each operation at the rate on the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations (MROs) 
prevailing at the time of take-up, plus a fixed spread of 10 basis points in the case of the first 
two TLTROs. The spread was abolished in the subsequent TLTRO-I operations. 
The borrowing limits were different for the first two operations in September and 
December 2014 (TLTROs against initial borrowing allowances/’stock TLTROs’) and the last six 
operations between March 2015 and June 2016 (TLTROs against additional borrowing 
allowances/ ‘flow TLTROs’). In the case of the stock TLTROs, banks’ borrowing could not 
exceed an amount equivalent to 7% of their eligible loans outstanding on 30 April 2014. Eligible 
loans are loans to the euro area non-financial private sector, excluding loans to households for 
house purchase.8 In the case of the flow TLTROs, the maximum amounts that could be 
borrowed depended on the evolution of banks’ net eligible lending in excess of bank-specific 
benchmarks. More precisely, the additional borrowing allowance was limited to three times the 
difference between the net lending since 30 April 2014 and the benchmark at the time of each 
borrowing. The benchmark was computed as follows:  
— for banks that exhibited positive eligible net lending9 in the twelve-month period to 
30 April 2014: the benchmark was always set at zero. 
— for banks that exhibited negative eligible net lending in the year to 30 April 2014, 
different benchmarks applied. For the 12 months between 30 April 2014 and 30 
April 2015, the average monthly net lending of each in the year to 30 April 2014 
was extrapolated. For the 12 months between 30 April 2015 and 30 April 2016, 
the benchmark remained constant. Overall, its shape resembled a kinked line.  
 
Banks that borrowed in the TLTROs and failed to achieve their benchmarks as at 30 
April 2016 were required to pay back their borrowings in full in September 2016. Participation 
in the TLTRO-I was massive. Euro area banks borrowed around 212 billion euros in the two 
initial TLTROs (September and December 2014) and 220 billion euros in the six additional 
TLTROs (between March 2015 and June 2016). 
                                                                            
6 Press release: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140605_2.en.html 
7 Press release: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/pr160310_1.en.html 
8 The eligible loans also exclude loans securitised or otherwise transferred without derecognition from the balance sheet.   
9 Eligible net lending means gross lending in the form of eligible loans net of repayments of outstanding amounts of 
eligible loans during a specific period.  
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4 Theoretical framework 
To illustrate the direct and indirect effects of the TLTROs on banks’ credit supply we present a 
simple version of the Monti-Klein model with oligopolistic competition. In particular, consider a 
banking system with two banks, a safe bank S and a risky bank R, which compete à la 
Cournot. These banks face a downward-sloping demand for loans 𝐿 and an upward-sloping 
supply for safe deposits 𝐷. The decision variables of bank 𝑖 = 𝑆, 𝑅 are the quantity of loans 𝐿𝑖 and 
the quantity of deposits 𝐷𝑖. For simplicity we abstract from funding sources other than deposits 
and assets other than loans. De facto our model captures by construction the most traditional 
form of banking and disregards banks’ capital market/trading/asset management activities. When 
choosing the optimal amounts of loans each bank takes into account that a marginal increase in 
its supply of loans reduces equilibrium rates on loans, which in turn lowers the unit return on its 
own loan portfolio. The same logic applies to their demand for deposit funding.  
For simplicity, let us assume that the inverse demand for loans 𝑟𝐿(𝐿
𝑆 + 𝐿𝑅) and the 
inverse supply of deposits 𝑟𝐷(𝐷
𝑆 + 𝐷𝑅) are characterised by the following linear functions:  
𝑟𝐿(𝐿
𝑆 + 𝐿𝑅) = 𝑎 − (𝐿𝑆 + 𝐿𝑅)                                                  (1) 
𝑟𝐷(𝐷
𝑆 + 𝐷𝑅) = 𝑐 + (𝐷𝑆 + 𝐷𝑅)                                                 (2) 
In addition, the balance sheet identity needs to hold, which requires in our case that 
banks need to fund their loan portfolio with deposits:  
𝐿𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖 for 𝑖 = 𝑆, 𝑅                                                         (3) 
The market clearing condition in the model economy requires that: 
𝐿∗ = 𝐿𝑆 + 𝐿𝑅 , where L* is the aggregate loan supply in the economy           (4) 
𝐷∗ = 𝐷𝑆 +𝐷𝑅, where D* is the aggregate deposit funding                            (5) 
𝐿∗ = 𝐷∗                                                                                                          (6) 
Let us first consider the symmetric case in which bank S and bank R are identical. 
Bank S’ profit maximization problem is the following:  
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐿𝑠,𝐷𝑠    𝜋
𝑆 = (𝑎 − (𝐿𝑆 + 𝐿𝑅))𝐿𝑆 − (𝑐 + (𝐷𝑆 + 𝐷𝑅))𝐷𝑆                        (7) 
                    s.t.: 𝐿𝑆 = 𝐷𝑆     
The solution of the above maximisation program, combined with 𝐿𝑅 = 𝐷𝑅, yields bank 
S’s reaction function to bank R’s loan supply decision  𝐿𝑆(𝐿𝑅):  
 𝐿𝑆 =
𝑎− 
𝑎+𝑐
2
2
−
1
2
 𝐿𝑅                                                        (8) 
Since the maximisation problem is fully symmetric for bank R, its reaction function 
 𝐿𝑅(𝐿𝑆) is the following:  
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 𝐿𝑅 =
𝑎− 
𝑎+𝑐
2
2
−
1
2
 𝐿𝑆                                                      (9) 
The standard reaction functions (8) and (9) are depicted by the thin lines in Chart 1. 
The intersection of those lines represents the Nash equilibrium 𝐸0 in the symmetric case. Note 
that given the oligopolistic setting, the overall quantity of loans and deposits in the economy will 
be lower compared to perfect competition. By slightly reducing the quantity of loans and 
deposits banks S and R can keep the rates on bank loans higher while those on deposits lower 
than under perfect competition. This allows banks to extract some of the consumer surplus, a 
standard result in this type of model.  
Chart 1: Loan supply reaction functions in the symmetric case and in the presence  
of funding impairments 
 
We now turn to the asymmetric case. We assume that bank S is perceived to be safe, 
while bank R is perceived to be risky. As a result, depositors require an extra compensation of 
𝜌 to fund bank R. The premium 𝜌 reflects the perceived probability of default of that bank. 
Bank R’s profit maximization problem is the following:  
max𝐿𝑅,𝐷𝑅   𝜋
𝑅 = (𝑎 − (𝐿𝑆 + 𝐿𝑅))𝐿𝑅 − (1 + 𝜌)(𝑐 + (𝐷𝑆 + 𝐷𝑅))𝐷𝑅                              (10) 
s.t.: 𝐿𝑅 = 𝐷𝑅    
The solution of the above maximisation program, combined with the balance sheet 
identity for the safe bank 𝐿𝑆 = 𝐷𝑆, yields bank R’s reaction function to bank S’s loan supply 
decision 𝐿𝑅(𝐿𝑆)′ in the case of a funding impairment: 
 𝐿𝑅 =
𝑎−
𝑎+𝑐
1+
1
1+𝜌
2
−
1
2
 𝐿𝑆                                                       (11) 
The risk premium required by investors translates into higher marginal funding costs 
for bank R and as result its overall supply of loans declines irrespective of the volume of loans 
provided by its competitor S. This leads to a parallel downward shift in bank’s R reaction 
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function, as depicted by the thick line in Chart 1. The intersection between the new reaction 
function of bank R, 𝐿𝑅(𝐿𝑆)′, and the reaction function of bank S,  𝐿𝑆(𝐿𝑅), represents the new 
Nash equilibrium 𝐸1. The comparison of the two equilibria 𝐸0 and 𝐸1 yields two main insights. 
First, the funding impairment of the risky bank leads to a decline in its supply of bank loans. 
Second, overall credit supply is also lower, as the supply of loans by the safe bank 
compensates for only half of the missing lending by its competitor (see equation 8).   
We now turn to the impact of TLTROs on the equilibrium in the loan market. We will 
show that the introduction of the TLTROs affects the loan supply of both banks even if only one 
of them actually bids in the operation, as the TLTROs have both direct and indirect effects. In 
particular, assume that banks can fund up to a fraction 𝛽 of their loan portfolio with TLTROs at 
an exogenous interest rate 𝑖. We assume that the central banks sets 𝑖 equal to deposit rate 
paid by the safe bank. In addition, we assume that bidding in the TLTRO entails additional, 
small fixed administrative costs.10 In this set-up, the safe bank will abstain from bidding since it 
does not benefit from a funding cost reduction and avoids the administrative costs. By 
contrast, given the price attractiveness of the TLTRO funding, the risky bank will exhaust its 
borrowing limit, so that 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂 = 𝛽𝐿𝑅. The balance sheet identity of the risky bank includes 
now TLTROs in addition to deposit funding: 𝐿𝑅 = 𝐷𝑅 + 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂. The combination of these two 
equations yields the new constraint, (1 − 𝛽)𝐿𝑅 = 𝐷𝑅, which indicates that the risky bank only 
funds a proportion 1 − 𝛽 of their loan portfolio with deposits. The new maximisation problem of 
the risky bank is the following:  
max𝐿𝑅,𝐷𝑅   𝜋
𝑅 = (𝑎 − (𝐿𝑆 + 𝐿𝑅))𝐿𝑅 − (1 + 𝜌)(𝑐 + (𝐷𝑆 +𝐷𝑅))𝐷𝑅 − 𝑖 ∙ 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂           (12) 
s.t.: (1 − 𝛽)𝐿𝑅 = 𝐷𝑅  and  𝑇𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂 = 𝛽𝐿𝑅.  
The solution of the above maximisation program, combined with the balance sheet 
identity of the safe bank 𝐿𝑆 = 𝐷𝑆, yields bank R’s reaction function in the case of funding 
impairments after the introduction of TLTROs 𝐿𝑅(𝐿𝑆)′′: 
𝐿𝑅 =
𝜉
2
  − (
1
2
+
1
2
𝛽(1−𝛽)
1
1+𝜌
+(1+𝛽)2
) 𝐿𝑆                                                (13) 
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜉 = 𝑎 − 𝑖𝛽 −
1 − 𝛽
1
1 + 𝜌 +
(1 − 𝛽)2
(𝑎 + 𝑐) +
𝛽(1 − 𝛽)
1
1 + 𝜌 +
(1 − 𝛽)2
(𝑎 + 𝑖(1 − 𝛽))  
Finally, note that the maximisation problem of bank S remains unchanged after the 
introduction of TLTRO. However, the shadow price of extending an additional unit of loans – in 
our case the marginal costs of deposit funding – for the safe bank changes. Since the risky 
bank substitutes deposits with TLTROs the competition in the deposit market weakens, 
providing a boost to the supply of loans by bank S. Mechanically, this effect is taken into 
account by considering the new balance sheet identity of the risky bank ( (1 − 𝛽)𝐿𝑅 = 𝐷𝑅 ) 
when obtaining bank S’ loan supply reaction function. The new reaction function of the safe 
bank is the following:  
𝐿𝑆 =
𝑎− 
𝑎+𝑐
2
2
− (
1
2
−
1
4
𝛽) 𝐿𝑅                                                   (14) 
                                                                            
10 These fixed administrative costs could be the reporting requirements and additional audit obligation that are a pre-
requisite for the access to the TLTROs.  
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The comparison of equations (8) and (14) reveals that the safe bank’s loan supply is 
now less sensitive to changes in the supply of loans by the risky bank. This is illustrated in 
Chart 2, which depicts the equilibria in the loan market before the introduction of the TLTROs 
(𝐸1) and following the implementation of the TLTROs (𝐸2). The reaction functions of both banks 
shift. The reaction function of the safe bank becomes steeper, while the intercept with the 
horizontal 𝐿𝑆 axis remains unchanged. In the case of the risky bank, both the slope and the 
intercept change, as the reaction function steepens and shifts upwards: given that the risky 
bank receives a significant funding cost relief due to the TLTROs, its supply of loans increases 
for any given value of loans granted by the safe bank. The new Nash equilibrium is 𝐸2, which in 
the example features higher loan supply by both banks. While lending by the risky bank always 
increases in equilibrium, for the safe bank it very much depends on the exact parameter values, 
in particular on the shape of the loan demand and deposit supply functions (a and c), the 
fraction of bank loans that can be funded with TLTROs (𝛽) and the exact TLTRO rate (𝑖).  
Chart 2: Loan supply reaction functions in the presence of funding impairments 
before and after the introduction of a TLTRO 
 
To put it differently, the impact on the loan supply by the safe bank is ambiguous 
because there are two opposite effects. On the one hand, the TLTROs reduce the marginal 
costs of its competitor, the risky bank, which expands its loan supply. Thereby the TLTROs 
promote stronger competition in the credit market. Since the banks compete à la Cournot, loan 
quantities are strategic substitutes, implying that an increase in the loan supply of the risky 
bank leads to a contraction in the loan supply of the safe bank. On the other hand, the TLTROs 
lead to weaker competition in the deposit market by the risky bank. As the risky bank 
substitutes deposits with TLTROs, competition in the deposit market weakens, which in turn 
implies lower marginal funding costs for the safe bank, which boosts its loan supply.  
The upshot of the theoretical discussion is that the TLTROs may have important 
indirect effects on the credit supply of non-participating banks, as measured empirically by 
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credit standards and loan margins. In particular, the TLTROs may have important funding 
externalities on non-bidding banks, which are not necessarily restricted to retail funding. For 
instance, as the TLTROs allow participating banks to replace market-based bank funding with 
borrowing from the central bank, they can result in a reduction in the supply of bank bonds in 
the economy. The scarcity of bank bond issuance should translate into lower yields on bank 
bonds, including those issued by intermediaries not participating in the TLTROs. In addition, 
the TLTROs may foster competition in the credit market by reducing the marginal funding costs 
of participating banks, which allows them to expand their credit supply. Non-participating 
banks may react by contracting their loan supply or by expanding their loan supply depending 
on which effect dominates: a) the improved market position of competitors that borrow from 
the TLTROs, which benefit from a direct funding costs reduction and are therefore able to (re-) 
gain market shares at the expense of non-participants or (b) the indirect funding costs relief 
enjoyed by bidders and non-bidders alike, which supports the supply of bank loans of both. 
Hence, the overall impact of the TLTROs on non-participating banks is a priori ambiguous and 
must be assessed empirically.11 
                                                                            
11 Note that demand for bank loans will increase as the lower funding costs of both bidders and non-bidders results in 
lower rates charged on bank loans. 
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5 Identification strategy  
Our main goal is to estimate the impact of the TLTROs on banks’ lending policies, as measured 
by bank credit standards and margins. There are two main channels. The first channel is direct: by 
participating in the TLTROs, a bank may reduce its funding costs and improve its overall 
liquidity position. This allows participating banks to relax credit standards, narrow margins and 
compete more aggressively. The second channel is indirect: TLTROs may influence on a 
bank’s lending policies through the positive effect on the balance sheets of its competitors and 
the less tense competition in important funding markets due to bidders’ recourse to long-term 
central bank funding.  
We construct two variables to measure those effects. The direct effect is captured 
with bank TLTROi , which is computed as the ratio between the uptake in the initial TLTROs 
(September and December 2014) by bank i and its total assets.12 The indirect effect is captured 
with country TLTRO(i)c , which is the ratio between the sum of the TLTRO uptakes of all the 
other banks in the country (i.e., excluding bank i) and the total assets of those banks. Formally:  
bank TLTROi =
TLTROi
total assetsi
                                                (15) 
country TLTRO(i)c =
∑ TLTROj
N−1
j≠i
∑ total assetsj
N−1
j≠i
                                        (16) 
There are two main specifications. In the first one, we estimate the probability that 
lending policies ease (i.e., eased credit standards or narrower margins, Yit = 1) as a function of 
bank TLTROi , country TLTRO(i)c and a wide set of bank controls, demand controls and macro 
controls, plus time dummies. Formally:  
Yict = α ∙ bank TLTROi + β ∙ country TLTRO(i)c + Xit−1
′ γ +Wit−1
′ δ + Xct−1
′ θ + dt + 𝑢𝑐𝑡 + εict  (17) 
where i is bank, c is country, t is quarter, Yit is the binary outcome variable (credit 
standards or margins), Xit−1
′  is a vector of time-varying bank controls, Wit−1
′  is a vector of 
demand controls (which also vary at the bank-quarter level), Xct−1
′  is a vector of time-varying 
macro controls, dt are time fixed effects, 𝑢𝑐𝑡 is a country-quarter error component and εict is 
an individual error term. The main coefficient of interest is β, which captures the indirect effect 
of the TLTROs on lending policies.  
The second specification is quite similar to (17), but focuses instead on the direct 
effect of the TLTROs. To do so, we drop the variable country TLTRO(i)c and the macro 
controls and saturate the regression with country-time fixed effects (dct). Formally:  
Yict = ρ ∙ bank TLTROi + Xit−1
′ γ +Wit−1
′ δ + dct + εict                           (18) 
The main coefficient of interest is ρ, which captures the direct effect of the TLTROs on 
lending policies.  
                                                                            
12 Using overall take-up instead of the take-up in only the first two TLTRO-I leads to overall very similar empirical findings 
but leads to a weaker instrument, in terms of the first-stage regressions. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1903 
We estimate (17) and (18) for the period 2014Q2-2017Q4. Hence, our empirical 
strategy implies a comparison of changes in credit standards/margins between treated and 
non-treated banks (e.g. high and low country TLTRO(i)c) after the announcement of the 
TLTROs in June 2014.13 We also perform placebo tests to make sure that any potential 
differences in the outcome variable across the two groups of banks were not present already 
before the TLTROs and thus can be attributed to the introduction of the measure.  
Estimation of (17) and (18) by OLS may lead to biased and inconsistent estimates due 
to selection bias.14 In particular, selection into treatment is non-random, as banks participated 
in the TLTROs on a voluntary basis. In particular, the evaluation of the policy may be biased 
upwards if the banks that borrowed (more) from the TLTRO had, on average, better lending 
opportunities. By contrast, the estimates may be biased downwards if the banks that borrowed 
(more) from the TLTRO had greater deleveraging needs.  
In order to obtain consistent estimates of β and ρ we use two instrumental variables 
that come from the institutional setting of the TLTROs, as in Benetton and Fantino (2017). In 
particular, as explained in section 3, in the initial TLTROs (September and December 2014) 
banks could borrow an amount equivalent to 7% of their eligible loans outstanding on 30 April 
2014. Crucially, notice that the stock of eligible loans was measured at a date prior to the 
announcement of the policy (June 2014). This initial allowance constitutes the exogenous 
component of the TLTRO uptakes, as it is based on exogenous parameters that are common 
across banks and on pre-determined banks’ balance sheet characteristics. By contrast, we 
disregard the amounts borrowed in the additional TLTROs (between March 2015 and June 
2016) because the additional borrowing allowances depended on the evolution of banks’ 
eligible lending activities in excess of bank-specific benchmarks. Hence, both the additional 
TLTRO uptakes and their borrowing allowances are clearly endogenous variables. 
Therefore, we construct two instrumental variables, bank allowancei  and 
country allowance(i)c. The first one is computed as the ratio between the initial borrowing 
allowance of bank i and its total assets. The second one is constructed as the ratio between 
the sum of the initial allowance of all the other banks in the country (i.e., excluding bank i) and 
the total assets of those banks. Formally:  
bank allowancei =
initial allowancei
total assetsi
                                           (19) 
country allowance(i)c =
∑ initial allowancej
N−1
j≠i
∑ total assetsj
N−1
j≠i
                                    (20) 
We then estimate (17) and (18) by 2SLS.15 Note that equation (17) includes the 
individual TLTRO uptakes, 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖, although we are really only interested in the 
                                                                            
13 Note that our dependent variables credit standards and, to a lower extent, loan margins, are quite sticky, i.e., they 
evolve very slowly over time. This means that we must also use the cross-section variation for identification, which 
renders the inclusion of bank fixed effects not feasible. 
14 In addition to selection bias, the fact that one regressor, country TLTRO(i)c, is the average of another, bank TLTROi, 
may complicate the interpretation of OLS estimates of equation (17). See Angrist and Pischke (2009), pages 193-195, 
for an explanation.  
15 Notice that the estimation of (17) via OLS would entail in addition an omitted variables bias from the correlation 
between country TLTRO(i)c and other country-quarter effects embodied in the error component 𝑢𝑐𝑡. For instance, the 
country’s business cycle may affect the country’s level of TLTRO uptakes because it determines banks’ lending 
opportunities and firms’ investment returns and it also affects credit standards and margins, which are usually 
anticyclical. This may generate a spurious correlation between the two. While the inclusion of time-varying macro 
controls (such as the industrial production index and the unemployment rate) mitigates this problem, a more complete 
solution is the approach we follow, IV estimation. By contrast, the estimation of (18) does not face this challenge, as 
the use of country-time fixed effects 𝑑𝑐𝑡 eliminates this source of variation. 
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aggregate effect of TLTROs –the effect of 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂(𝑖)𝑐- in that specification. The 
inclusion of 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖 is motivated by the fact that any instrument for 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂(𝑖)𝑐 
must be also correlated with 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖. By including it in the regression (as a second 
endogenous variable) we avoid a violation of the exclusion restriction.16  
Finally, an additional identification challenge is to disentangle shocks to credit supply 
from shocks to credit demand, as those shocks are often correlated and what we observe are 
equilibrium outcomes. For instance, banks with high TLTRO uptakes may face more dynamic 
demand conditions or deal with more creditworthy borrowers, which may induce them to ease 
credit standards or narrow margins. To control for demand factors, we include a large vector of 
control variables that measure the evolution of credit demand by firms and households in 
different segments (e.g. loans to SMEs), as well as the factors underlying those developments 
(e.g., consumer confidence) as reported by banks in the BLS.17 
Regarding inference, standard errors are clustered at the bank level to allow for 
potential heteroscedasticity and serial correlation within groups in the error structure. 
Nevertheless, results are very similar when clustering at a higher level of aggregation such as 
country.18 
                                                                            
16 See Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) for a similar identification strategy in the context of the social returns to schooling 
and human capital externalities.  
17 In the case of non-financial corporations, demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, 
increase) in the demand of credit in the following segments: all firms, SMEs and large firms, short-term loans and long-
term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt 
refinancing/restructuring. In the case of housing loans, demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, 
unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by households for house purchase and changes in the demand due to 
housing market prospects, consumer confidence, the general level of interest rates, debt refinancing and the 
regulatory and fiscal regime of housing markets. 
18 While clustering at the country level may lead to standard errors that are biased downwards due to few clusters 
(Bertrand et al. 2004), inference using wild cluster bootstrap, a solution developed by Cameron et al. (2008), leads to 
qualitatively similar results. 
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6 Data and variables  
The data employed in the baseline analyses come from four sources: the Individual Bank 
Lending Survey (iBLS), the Individual Balance Sheet Items (IBSI), the Individual MFI Interest 
Rate (IMIR) databases and proprietary information on banks’ participation in central bank credit 
operations. The iBLS database contains confidential, non-anonymized replies to the ECB’s 
Bank Lending Survey (BLS) for a subsample of banks participating in the BLS. The BLS is a 
quarterly survey through which euro area banks are asked about developments in their 
respective credit markets since 2003.19 Currently the sample comprises more than 140 banks 
from 19 euro area countries and covers around 60% of the amount outstanding of loans to the 
private non-financial sector in the euro area. However, there are six countries that do not share 
the confidential, non-anonymized replies to the BLS so they do not participate in iBLS (see 
Table 1 for a view of the distribution of observations per country).20 
The BLS is specifically designed to distinguish between supply and demand 
conditions in the euro area credit markets. Supply conditions are measured through credit 
standards (i.e., the internal guidelines or loan approval criteria of a bank) and credit terms and 
conditions (loan margins, loan size, loan maturity, etc).21 The BLS also contains information on 
the evolution of credit demand by firms and households and the factors underlying these 
developments. In addition, several ad hoc questions have been added in the recent years to 
analyse the impact of the main non-standard monetary policy measures introduced by the 
ECB, such as the negative deposit facility rate (DFR) or the expanded asset purchase 
programme (APP), on several dimensions such as banks’ balance sheets, credit standards and 
terms and conditions. 
IBSI and IMIR contain balance-sheet and interest rate information of the 326 largest 
euro area banks,22 which is individually transmitted on a monthly basis from the national central 
banks to the ECB since July 2007. We have matched both datasets with the iBLS and 
information on banks’ participation in Eurosystem credit operations, including the TLTROs. We 
restrict the sample to the period spanning from 2014Q2 (i.e., announcement of TLTRO-I) to 
2017Q4.23 The resulting sample contains 1,784 observations corresponding to an unbalanced 
                                                                            
19 For more detailed information about the survey see Köhler-Ulbrich, Hempell and Scopel (2016). Visit also 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_surveys/bank_lending_survey/html/index.en.html 
20 Germany participates in the iBLS with a sub-sample of banks that have agreed to transmit their non-anonymized 
replies to the ECB.  
21 According to the BLS, credit standards are the internal guidelines or loan approval criteria of a bank. They are 
established prior to the actual loan negotiation on the terms and conditions and the actual loan approval/rejection 
decision. They define the types of loan a bank considers desirable and undesirable, the designated sectoral or 
geographic priorities, the collateral deemed acceptable and unacceptable, etc. Credit standards specify the required 
borrower characteristics (e.g., balance sheet conditions, income situation, age, employment status) under which a loan 
can be obtained. On the other side, credit terms and conditions refer to the conditions of a loan that a bank is willing to 
grant, i.e., to the terms and conditions of the individual loan actually approved as laid down in the loan contract which 
was agreed between the bank and the borrower. They generally consist of the agreed spread over the relevant 
reference rate, the size of the loan, the access conditions and other terms and conditions in the form of non-interest 
rate charges (i.e., fees), collateral or guarantees which the respective borrower needs to provide (including 
compensating balances), loan covenants and the agreed loan maturity. 
22 55 monthly time series are required on the asset side, which include data on holdings of cash, loans, debt securities, 
MMF shares/units, equity and non-MMF investment fund shares/units, non-financial assets and remaining assets. On 
the liability side, the time series cover information on deposits, included and not included in M3, issuance of debt 
securities, capital and reserves and remaining liabilities. 
23 As most regressors are lagged one period, they are measured in the period spanning 2014Q1 to 2017Q2. 
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panel of 130 banks from 13 countries (see Table 1 for a view of the distribution of observations 
per country).24 However, the estimation sample will be generally smaller due to missing values. 
The definitions of the variables used in this study are displayed in Table 2. The 
dependent variables are changes in credit standards and margins in loans to enterprises and 
households for house purchase, as reported in the BLS. In particular, the BLS asks banks on a 
quarterly basis about the evolution of the credit standards applied to their new loans or credit 
lines to enterprises and households, as well as the margins charged on them. Banks must 
answer whether they have tightened credit standards, kept them basically unchanged or eased 
them over the past three months.25 Regarding margins (defined as the spread over a relevant 
market reference rate), the BLS distinguishes between margins on average loans and margins 
on riskier loans. Banks must answer whether they have tightened them (wider margins), kept 
them basically unchanged or eased (narrower margins) over the past three months.  
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables can be found in Table 3. They are 
dummy variables that equal 1 in the case of easing and 0 otherwise. Credit standards are very 
stable over time. The proportion of banks that report an easing of credit standards ranges 
between 5% and 7%, depending on the segment. Margins on average loans ease more 
frequently, in about 25% of the observations, while margins on riskier loans are narrowed less 
often (about 5%). Therefore, while banks adapt their lending policies through the adjustment of 
both loan terms & conditions and credit standards, the former seem to be more flexible 
instruments than the latter. Regarding bank-level controls, we proxy bank size with the natural 
logarithm of the bank’s total assets (size). Leverage is defined as the ratio of capital and 
reserves over total unweighted assets (capital ratio). Liquidity is measured with a liquidity ratio, 
expressed as the sum of cash, holdings of government securities and Eurosystem deposits 
over total assets (%). This variable may also capture the impact of the ECB’s expanded asset 
purchase programme (APP) on banks’ balance sheets, which was announced in January 2015. 
We also include a loan-to-deposit ratio, in logs.26 The importance of deposits as a funding 
source is captured with the deposit ratio, the ratio between the deposits by households and 
non-financial corporations over total assets. Market share is the ratio between a bank's 
outstanding loans and the total loans of the country's banking sector (%). We also control for 
the bank’s legal form (head institution, national subsidiary, foreign subsidiary, foreign branch). 
Finally, we need to control for the impact of negative interest rates on banks’ lending policies 
because both the TLTRO I and the negative deposit facility rate (DFR) were announced in June 
2014, as part of the ECB’s credit easing package.27 To do so we include the variable NDFR, a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank reported that the ECB’s negative DFR contributed to 
a decrease of the bank’s net interest income in the past six months and 0 otherwise. This 
variable, which comes from Arce et al. (2018), is constructed using an ad-hoc question in the 
BLS that is asked on a semi-annual basis.28 We also include a set of relevant macroeconomic 
controls: the 10-year sovereign bond, the industrial production index, the unemployment rate, 
the consumer price index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.  
                                                                            
24 The level of consolidation of the banking group differs between BLS and IBSI. Consequently, we have 130 banks in 
IBSI but 112 banks in BLS, because sometimes the head of the group is the one that answers to the BLS but we have 
unconsolidated balance sheets of the head and its subsidiaries in IBSI. 
25 While the BLS differentiates between “tightened considerably” and “tightened somewhat” and between “eased 
considerably” and “eased somewhat”, we aggregate these categories into “tightened” and “eased”, as done in the 
regular BLS reports prepared by the ECB. 
26 To correct for right skewness and outliers.  
27 The negative DFR was introduced on 11 June 2014, the TLTRO-I were announced on 5 June 2014. 
28 The exact wording of the question is: “Given the ECB’s negative deposit facility rate, did this measure, either directly or 
indirectly, contribute to a decrease / increase of your bank’s net interest income over the past six months?”. 
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Table 4 displays descriptive statistics of the bank characteristics, including the key 
regressors, the instrumental variables and the bank-level controls, as well as summary statistics 
of the macro controls. Table 5 presents the means of the bank characteristics for banks that 
participated in the TLTROs and banks that did not participate, together with the p-value 
associated with a two-sample t-test of equality of means, at the quarter of announcement of 
TLTRO-I (2014Q2). Out of the 116 banks in the sample at 2014Q2, 55 banks participated in 
the TLTRO.29 The average participating bank borrowed an amount equivalent to 1.7% of its 
total assets (mean of bank TLTROi), close to its borrowing limit, 2% (mean of bank allowancei). 
Regarding differences between bidders and non-bidders, the average TLTRO uptake of a 
bank’s competitors (mean of 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂(𝑖)𝑐) is higher in the case of participating banks. 
This likely reflects that banks located in countries under intense financial market scrutiny during 
the sovereign crisis episode participated more widely and borrower larger amounts. This is not 
surprising since the funding cost benefit of accessing the TLTROs, instead of alternative 
funding, was on average higher for banks located in those countries. To some extent it may 
also reflect that the recourse to the operations are strategic complements: a bank is more likely 
to participate if its rivals borrow heavily in the operations. In addition, TLTRO bidders are 
significantly larger than non-bidders, probably due to the fixed costs associated with 
participation, and have a larger market share in the segment of loans to NFCs. With respect to 
risk, there are no significant differences in terms of capital and non-performing loan ratios, but 
bidders have higher CDS spreads than non-bidders, suggesting that they are riskier. However, 
this last result must be interpreted with caution, as we only have information on CDS spreads 
for 83 banks. Participating banks also have a substantially higher share of liquid assets, 
probably because some of those assets can be pledged as collateral in the TLTROs and the 
ECB’s main refinancing operations. Bidders are also more likely to experience a decline in their 
net interest income due to negative interest rates (NDFR=1) than non-bidders.  
In our empirical exercises we also use controls for firms’ demand for credit. In 
particular, the BLS asks banks about perceived changes in the demand for loans or credit lines 
to enterprises and households. Banks must answer whether the demand for their loans has 
decreased, has remained basically unchanged or has increased over the past three months.30 
In the case of loans to non-financial corporations, we differentiate between demand for loans 
from SMEs and large firms and also between short-term loans and long-term loans. We also 
distinguish the evolution of credit demand according to the purpose of the loan (loans for fixed 
investment, for inventories and working capital, for mergers and acquisitions and for debt 
refinancing). In the case of loans to households for house purchase, we include dummy 
variables for changes in the demand of credit in that segment, as well as changes in the 
demand due to the factors “housing market prospects” and “consumer confidence”.31 Table 6 
presents descriptive statistics of these variables. The demand indicators are also relatively 
stable, but they change more frequently than credit standards. In addition, demand is more 
likely to increase than to decrease, as expected in a period of economic recovery. 
Descriptive analyses suggest a meaningful relationship between the dependent 
variables and the key regressors. For the segment of loans to NFCs, Figure 2 displays the 
averages of the dependent variables (i.e., the proportion of banks that eased credit 
                                                                            
29 Note that we have an unbalanced panel. Out of 130 banks in the whole sample (2014Q2-2017Q4), 60 of them 
participated in the initial TLTROs.  
30 As with the supply indicators, we merge “decreased considerably” and “decreased somewhat” into “decreased” and 
“increased considerably” and “increased somewhat” into “increased”. 
31 Similarly to the case of supply factors (e.g. competition), a demand factor may contribute to lower demand, to keeping 
demand unchanged and to higher demand. We exclude other BLS demand factors (general level of interest rates, debt 
refinancing/restructuring and regulatory and fiscal regime of housing markets) because there are only available since 
2015Q1 due a change in the questionnaire.  
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standards/margins) for banks with high/low values of 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂(𝑖)𝑐 (above and below the 
median, respectively). According to Figure 2, banks that belong to the high country TLTRO 
group are more likely to ease credit standards and margins on average loans than banks that 
belong to the low country TLTRO. The differences are sizeable and statistically significant.32 For 
instance, the proportion of banks that eased overall credit standards was 8% for the high 
country TLTRO group and only 3% for the low country TLTRO group. By contrast, banks 
whose national competitors borrowed heavily in the TLTROs (high country TLTRO group) were 
less likely to narrow margins on riskier loans than banks from the low country TLTRO group 
(5% and 8%, respectively). A similar analysis is displayed in Figure 3 for banks with high/low 
values of bank TLTROi (above and below the median).
33 According to Figure 3, banks with high 
TLTRO uptakes were more likely to ease credit standards and margins on average loans than 
banks with low uptakes. The differences are also statistically significant, although somewhat 
smaller than in Figure 2. By contrast, the proportion of banks that narrowed margins on riskier 
loans is very similar in both groups. All in all, the analysis of the two figures suggests potentially 
meaningful links between TLTRO uptakes at the bank and country level and changes in banks’ 
lending policies. However, as these associations may be purely due to positive selection bias 
(e.g. banks with high TLTRO uptakes may have better lending opportunities) or confounding 
events (e.g. those banks may have been more affected by the negative DFR that was 
introduced in parallel), more formal analyses are required. 
                                                                            
32 The statistical significance of those differences is assessed by performing two-sample tests on the equality of 
proportions.  
33 As the median of bank TLTROi is 0, the two groups consist of participating and non-participating banks.  
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7 Empirical results  
7.1 Baseline results  
Let us start with the segment of loans to NFCs. As a benchmark, Table 7a and Table 7b 
display the estimation of (17) and (18) by OLS. Table 7a shows that there is a positive and 
significant correlation between the TLTRO uptakes of a bank’s national competitors, as 
measured by country TLTRO(i)c, and the probability that the bank eases overall credit 
standards (column (1)), credit standards to SMEs (column (2)) and credit standards to large 
firms (column (3)). This suggests a significant indirect effect of the TLTROs on bank credit 
standards. By contrast, there is no significant impact on bank margins (columns (4) and (5)). In 
addition, Table 7b shows no clear evidence of direct effects, as a bank’s TLTRO uptake is not 
significantly correlated with the probability of easing credit standards or lowering margins. The 
only exception is column (5), which displays a negative sign: higher TLTRO uptakes are 
associated with a lower probability of narrowing margins on riskier loans. This observation may 
indicate that the TLTROs did not lead to excessive risk taking by banks.  
To make sure that our results are not biased by endogeneity we use the initial TLTRO-I 
allowance (at bank and country level respectively) as instrument variables and estimate (17) and 
(18) by 2SLS.34 First we confirm that the instruments are not weak. Table 8 reports the first 
stage regressions corresponding to (17) (columns (1) and (2)) and the first stage regression that 
corresponds to (18) (column (3)). We observe positive and strong relationships between the 
instruments and the endogenous variables. In particular, a 1 pp increase in a bank’s initial 
allowance leads to a 0.49 pp increase in a bank’s TLTRO uptake (over total assets), and a 1 pp 
increase in a country’s initial allowance leads to a 0.59 pp increase in a country’s total TLTRO 
uptake (over the country’s total assets). In columns (1) and (2), the multivariate F-statistics 
developed by Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016)35 exceed Stock and Yogo (2005)’s critical 
values36 and they are significantly greater than 10, the rule of thumb suggested by Staiger and 
Stock (1997). The same is true for a conventional first-stage F-statistic in column (3). Hence, 
we can conclude that our instruments are not weak.  
The 2SLS estimates, which are presented in Table 9, are consistent with the previous 
OLS results. Regarding indirect effects (Table 9a), country TLTRO(i)c has a positive effect on 
overall credit standards, credit standards for SMEs and credit standards for large firms 
(columns (1), (2) and (3)). The effects are sizeable. For instance, a standard deviation increase in 
country TLTRO(i)c leads to a 5.3 pp increase in the probability that a bank eases overall credit 
standards and an 8.8 pp increase in the probability of easing credit standards to large firms. By 
contrast, the TLTRO uptakes of a bank’s competitors have no significant effect on margins on 
average loans (column (4)) and riskier loans (column (5), coefficient only marginally significant). 
Finally, there is no clear evidence of direct effects (Table 9b), as the coefficient on bank TLTROi  
is insignificant in all specifications.  
The analysis of loans to households for house purchase is presented in Table 10 (OLS) 
and Table 11 (2SLS). For the sake of brevity, let us focus on the IV estimates. With respect to 
                                                                            
34 In the Supplement of this paper we report estimates of (17) by probit and IV probit. Results are broadly similar.  
35 For multiple endogenous variables, inspection of the individual first-stage F-statistics is not sufficient. To see why, 
suppose there are two instruments for two endogenous variables and that the first instrument is strong and predicts 
both endogenous variables well, while the second instrument is weak. The first-stage F-statistics in each of the two 
first-stage equations are likely to be high, but the model is weakly identified, because one instrument is not enough to 
capture two causal effects. See Angrist and Pischke (2009).  
36 For a Wald test with maximal size of 10%.  
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indirect effects (Table 11a), country TLTRO(i)c has a positive effect on credit standards (column 1). 
In particular, a standard deviation increase in the TLTRO uptakes of a bank’s competitors 
implies an 8.8 pp increase in the probability that the bank eases its own credit standards. 
Regarding direct effects (Table 11b), there is no significant impact on credit standards (column 1). 
However, column (2) reports a positive effect of bank TLTROi on the probability of narrowing 
margins on average loans. The effect is strong, as a standard deviation increase in a bank’s 
TLTRO uptake (relative to total assets) implies a 15.8 pp increase in the probability of lowering 
margins on average loans.  
7.2 Analysis of the direct effects of the TLTROs: the intensive vs. extensive margin  
The evidence presented so far suggests that direct effects are weak, except in the case of 
margins on loans for house purchase. However, notice that the regressor of interest, 
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖, may hide some interesting heterogeneity. In particular, the variable takes the 
value 0 for about 50% of the observations (banks that did not borrow in the TLTROs) and it 
is continuously distributed between the values 0.1% and 5% for the other 50% of the 
observations (banks that borrowed in the TLTROs). Hence, we may distinguish the direct 
effect of TLTROs on bank lending policies in the extensive margin (participation vs. non-
participation) and the intensive margin (amount of borrowed funds, conditional on 
participation). For the analysis of the extensive margin, we estimate (18) but replacing the 
variable 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖 with the variable 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖, a dummy that equals 1 the bank 
borrowed any amount in the initial TLTROs (September and December 2014). We treat 
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 as endogenous and instrument it with bank allowancei. For the analysis of 
the intensive margin, we estimate (18) for the subsample of banks that participated in the 
initial TLTROs. 
The analysis for the segment of loans to NFCs is presented in Table 12. Table 12a 
examines the intensive margin and Table 12b examines the extensive margin. According to 
Table 12a, there are no substantial differences in the lending policies of participating and non-
participating banks, as the coefficient on 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is always statistically insignificant. In 
other words, there is no “participation effect”. By contrast, for the subsample of bidding banks 
(Table 12b), the coefficient on 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑇𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖 is positive and significant in columns (3) and (4), 
indicating that high TLTRO uptakes lead to a higher probability of easing credit standards on 
large firms and to a higher probability of narrowing margins on average loans. The effects are 
strong: a standard deviation increase in a bank’s TLTRO uptake increases the probability of 
easing credit standards on large firms by 12.4 pp and it raises the probability of narrowing 
margins on average loans by 20 pp. This suggests that, for the subsample of bidding banks, 
the reduction in funding costs caused by the TLTROs is transmitted through easier lending 
policies to large safe firms.  
The analysis for the segments of loans to households is presented in Table 13. Table 
13a examines the intensive margin and Table 13b examines the extensive margin. According to 
Table 13a, bidding banks are much more likely (62 pp) to narrow margins on average loans 
than non-bidders, a strong “participation effect”. The effect on those margins also takes place 
in the intensive margin (Table 13b): for the subsample of bidding banks, a standard deviation 
increase in a bank’s TLTRO uptake raises the probability of narrowing margins on average 
loans by 28.6 pp. All in all, the picture that emerges from Tables 9, 11, 12 and 13 is that there 
are substantial direct effects of TLTROs on lending policies. The direct transmission of 
monetary policy takes place mainly through the adjustment of margins on loans to relatively 
safe borrowers.  
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7.3 Further analysis of indirect effects: the role of competition 
The evidence presented so far suggests that the TLTROs have important indirect effects on 
banks’ lending policies. Recall that, according to the above stylised model, large-scale 
recourse to the TLTROs has two simultaneous effects: (i) it fosters intense competition in the 
credit market and (ii) it eases competitive pressures in funding markets. While for bidders 
(i.e., the risky bank) these two effects go in the same direction,37 for non-bidders (i.e., the safe 
bank) the effects are opposite. On the one hand their relative competitive position vis-à-vis 
bidders worsens, ceteris paribus contracting the loan supply of non-bidders. On the other 
hand, their access to market funding improves, supporting their supply of loans. The empirical 
results presented so far suggest that the overall indirect effect is positive, i.e. that the overall 
easier access to market funding for non-bidders more than compensates for their lost 
competitive position vis-à-vis bidders. 
Against this background we try to isolate the positive indirect impact of the TLTROs 
on the loan supply of non-bidders via the positive funding externalities. We do this by 
controlling for the intensity of competition in credit markets, as reported by banks in the BLS. In 
particular, the BLS asks banks about the evolution of several factors that affect their credit 
standards and their terms and conditions. Specifically, a factor may contribute to a tightening 
of credit standards (terms & conditions), to keeping credit standards (terms & conditions) 
unchanged or to an easing of credit standards (terms & conditions). In this section we use the 
variable competition, which equals 1 if the factor "pressure from competition" contributed to an 
easing of terms and conditions, and 0 if it was unchanged or contributed to a tightening.38  
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 14 and 15. Note that in this set-up 
the coefficient on country TLTRO(i)c only captures the positive funding externality of those 
operations. As expected, the respective coefficients are positive and significant when the 
dependent variables are credit standards (columns 1-3 of Table 14 and column 1 of Table 15). 
The effects are also sizeable. For instance, a standard deviation increase in 
country TLTRO(i)c leads to a 6.5 pp increase in the probability that a bank eases overall credit 
standards to NFCs and to a 7.3 pp increase in the probability of easing credit standards to 
households for house purchase. Therefore, the available evidence suggests that the TLTROs 
generate significant positive funding externalities, as non-bidders may benefit from weaker 
competition in the deposit and bond markets. Note that the coefficients on competition are 
positive and significant: an increase in competition leads to a higher probability of eased credit 
standards and narrow margins.  
We also go on to test whether the overall indirect effects of the TLTROs are stronger in 
more competitive environments. Then we estimate equation (17) by 2SLS in subsamples of 
observations for which competition equals 1 and 0 (high and low competitive pressures, 
respectively). Results are displayed in Tables 16 (loans to NFCs) and 17 (housing loans). In the 
case of loans to NFCs (Table 16), the indirect effect of the TLTROs on credit standards is very 
strong for banks facing high competitive pressures (columns 1 to 3, Table 16a). For instance, a 
standard deviation increase in country TLTRO(i)c raises the probability of easing overall credit 
standards by 21 pp. In addition, an increase in the uptakes of a bank’s competitors reduces 
the probability of narrowing margins on riskier loans, suggesting that the TLTROs did not 
                                                                            
37 Access to the TLTROs levels the playing field from their perspective and results in an overall improved competitive 
position vis-à-vis non-bidders. And on top of that, the interest rates on deposits decline as a substitute for market 
funding is introduced. 
38 Similar results are found when we use the variable competition (credit standards), which equals 1 if the factor 
"competition from other banks" contributed to an easing of credit standards and 0 if it was unchanged or contributed 
to a tightening.  
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translate into excessive risk taking (column 5, Table 16a). By contrast, those effects are virtually 
non-existent for banks facing low competitive pressures (Table 16b). In the segment of loans to 
households for house purchase (Table 17), the impact of country TLTRO(i)c on credit 
standards is significant in both subsamples, but much larger (7 times) in the case of high 
competitive pressures.  
Alternatively, we test this hypothesis in Tables 18 and 19, which report 2SLS 
estimates of equation (17) in subsamples of banks with high and low market share (above and 
below the median, respectively). In Table 18 (loans to NFCs) we can observe that the impact of 
country TLTRO(i)c on credit standards is particularly high for banks with a low market share 
(Table 18a, columns 1to 3). For instance, a standard deviation increase in country TLTRO(i)c is 
associated with a 14.4 pp increase in the probability of easing overall credit standards. By 
contrast, in the sample of banks with high market share (Table 18b), the effect is only 
significant in the segment of large firms (column (3)), and even in this case it is substantially  
smaller. Similarly, in Table 19 (loans to households for house purchase) we observe a very 
strong effect in the case of banks with a low market share: a standard deviation increase in 
country TLTRO(i)c raises the probability of easing credit standards by 17.7 pp (column 1, Table 
19a). However, the effect is much smaller, and only marginally significant, in the subsample of 
banks with high market share (column 1, Table 19b). In addition, an increase in the TLTRO 
uptakes of a bank’s competitors leads to a lower probability of narrowing margins on riskier 
loans in the case of banks with low market shares (column 3, Table 19a). These findings 
suggest that the indirect effects of the TLTROs are particularly strong in the case of banks that 
face strong competition in the credit market, as proxied by low market shares.  
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8 Robustness tests 
A standard concern in policy evaluation is the presence of pre-existing trends. If, for some 
reason, the evolution of treatment and control groups was not parallel before the 
implementation of the policy, the estimates may pick up such behaviour, rather than the causal 
impact of the policy. In our empirical implementation, our treatment groups, banks with high 
TLTRO uptakes and banks whose national competitors borrowed heavily in the TLTROs, could 
have started easing credit standards/margins well before the announcement of the TLTROs in 
June 2014.  
In order to rule out such concerns, we carry out a falsification test. In particular, we 
estimate equations (14) and (15) by 2SLS for a placebo period spanning from 2010Q2-
2014Q1. The placebo period is as long as the “true period” (2014Q2-2017Q4) and ends right 
before the announcement of the TLTROs. In other words, we assume that banks borrowed 
from the TLTROs in June 2010 and we observe their lending behaviour in the following 19 
quarters. 
Results of the falsification tests are presented in Tables 20 (loans to NFCs) and 21 
(housing loans). Regarding the impact of country TLTRO(i)c on credit standards (Table 20a and 
21a), the coefficients on the variable are no longer statistically significant or -in the case of 
credit standards on loans to SMEs- even negative and significant. With respect to the impact  
of bank TLTROi, the coefficients are generally insignificant (Table 20b and 21b). These results 
suggest that our main findings are not driven by pre-existing trends.  
Another concern regarding the previous empirical analysis is that we may pick up the 
effect of the second series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO II) that were 
implemented between June 2016 and March 2017. In the case of TLTRO II (announced on 
March 201639), banks were able to borrow a total amount of up to 30% of their eligible loans 
outstanding at 31 January 2016.40 Incentives for banks to lend to the non-financial private 
sector were provided via reduction in the interest rate applied in the operations.41 The uptakes 
in TLTRO-I and TLTRO-II are likely to be correlated, as participating banks used part of the 
funds to roll over expiring debts. To address this concern, we estimate (14) and (15) by 2SLS 
for the shorter period 2014Q2-2016Q1, i.e., before the implementation of TLTRO-II.  
The results are presented in Tables 22 and 23. They are very similar to the baseline 
results (Tables 9 and 11). In the case of loans to NFCs, the indirect impact of TLTROs on credit 
standards becomes larger (Table 22a). For instance, a standard deviation increase in 
country TLTRO(i)c leads to a 6.8 pp increase in the probability that a bank eases overall credit 
standards and a 10.4 pp increase in the probability of easing credit standards to large firms. 
Interestingly, the negative impact of country TLTRO(i)c on the probability of narrowing margins 
on riskier loans also becomes stronger and more significant. In particular, a standard deviation 
increase in country TLTRO(i)c reduces by 8.7 pp the probability that the bank narrows margins 
on riskier loans. As before, the direct impact of TLTROs on credit standards and margins is not 
                                                                            
39 Press release: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/pr160310_1.en.html 
40 In particular, 30% of their eligible loans less any amount which was previously borrowed and was still outstanding 
under the first two TLTRO operations conducted in 2014. 
41 The interest rate applied to TLTRO II was fixed for each operation at the rate applied in the main refinancing operations 
(MROs) prevailing at the time of allotment. In addition, counterparties whose eligible net lending in the period between 1 
February 2016 and 31 January 2018 exceeded their benchmark were charged a lower rate for the entire term of the 
operation. See ECB press release for details: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/pr160310_1.en.html 
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significantly different from zero (Table 22b). Things also change little in the case of housing 
loans, as there is still a significant impact of country TLTRO(i)c on credit standards (Table 23a) 
and a significant impact of bank TLTROi  on margins on average loans (Table 23b). Those 
effects are also larger than in the baseline estimations.  
Note that the theoretical framework presented in Section 4 models credit supply in 
terms of loan quantities, while the empirical analysis proxies credit supply with credit standards 
and loan margins. While credit standards are a reliable proxy for credit supply according to 
previous literature (e.g. Lown and Morgan (2006) and Ciccarelli et al. (2015)), for robustness we 
replace them by credit growth rates42 in equations (17) and (18). Results are presented in Table 
24, which again distinguishes between indirect effects (Table 24a) and direct effects (Table 24b) 
for loans to NFCS (column 1) and loans to households for house purchase (column 2). The 
coefficient on country TLTRO(i)c is positive and statistically significant in both segments, 
indicating that a higher TLTRO uptake by a bank’s national competitors leads to higher credit 
growth. In particular, a standard deviation increase in country TLTRO(i)c causes credit growth 
to increase by 0.8 percentage points in each segment. By contrast, there is no evidence of 
direct effects, as the coefficients on bank TLTROi are not statistically different from zero.  
Finally, an implicit assumption of the whole analysis of indirect effects is that European 
credit and funding markets are segmented at the national level, probably due to a large array of 
regulatory, technological and cultural factors (e.g. different languages). In this context, each 
bank is influenced by the behaviour of its national competitors, as captured by the variable 
country TLTRO(i)c. However, this may not be true in the case of very large well-diversified 
banks that simultaneously compete in many European markets. To ameliorate this concern, we 
take out from the sample those banks classified as globally systemic banks (G-SIB) by the 
Financial Stability Board. These banks have many similarities: they are very large, are all 
conglomerates, have an international geographical orientation and tend to be diversified 
(Altavilla et. al 2018). We then re-run regressions (17) and (18). The results, displayed in tables 
25 and 26, are very similar to the baselines estimates: significant indirect effects on credit 
standards in both segments and significant direct effects on margins on average loans to 
households for house purchase. 
                                                                            
42 Computed as quarterly changes in the natural log of the stock of loans. They are windsorised at 90% to reduce the 
impact of outliers.  
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9 Conclusions 
This paper assesses the impact of the Eurosystem’s Targeted Long-Term Refinancing 
Operations (TLTROs), announced in June 2014, on the lending policies of euro area banks. To 
guide our empirical research, we first present a simple model of oligopolistic competition in the 
banking sector in which two banks compete à la Cournot in the loan and deposit markets. One 
of the banks, with high funding costs, participates in the TLTROs, while the other one, with low 
funding costs, does not. The model helps us distinguish between the direct and the indirect 
effects of the TLTROs. Regarding direct effects, the TLTROs reduce the marginal costs of the 
participating bank, which expands its credit supply. There are two indirect effects. First, the 
TLTROs increase the competition in the credit market by levelling the playing field. Second, as 
the bidder replaces part of deposit funding with TLTRO funding, the competition in the deposit 
market weakens, which reduces deposit rates and the marginal costs of the non-bidder. The 
main predictions of the model are a positive direct impact of the TLTRO on the bidder’s credit 
supply and an ambiguous indirect impact on the non-bidder’s loan supply.  
We then test those predictions with the confidential answers to the ECB’s Bank 
Lending Survey (BLS) by 130 banks from 13 euro area countries, matched with individual bank 
balance-sheet information and operations data. We measure bank lending policies with credit 
standards (i.e., the internal guidelines or loan approval criteria of a bank) and loan margins  
(i.e., the agreed spread over the relevant reference rate), as reported by banks in the BLS. 
Regarding direct effects, our empirical analysis indicates that the transmission of monetary 
policy takes place mainly through the adjustment of margins on loans to relatively safe 
borrowers. In addition, our results suggest strong indirect effects of the TLTROs on credit 
standards, but no significant impact on margins on average loans. These effects are 
concentrated in banks with low market share that face high competitive pressures, suggesting 
that competition in the credit market plays a crucial role.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that we find significant effects of the TLTROs on a 
category of loans, housing loans, which was not targeted by the measure. This suggests 
important spillovers of the TLTROs, as banks search for yield in a profitable segment of the 
credit market. However, there is also some evidence that the TLTROs did not lead to excessive 
risk taking, as TLTRO uptakes are negatively correlated with the probability of narrowing 
margins on riskier loans. 
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Country Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
AT 8 6.15 117 6.56
BE 4 3.1 60 3.4
DE 28 21.5 417 23.4
EE 5 3.9 60 3.4
ES 10 7.7 150 8.4
FR 15 12 210 12
IE 7 5.38 105 5.89
IT 23 17.7 272 15.3
LT 5 3.9 48 2.7
LU 5 3.9 75 4.2
NL 10 7.7 120 6.7
PT 5 4 75 4
SK 5 3.85 75 4.2
Total 130 100 1,784 100
Table 1: Number of banks and number of observations by country
Number of banks Number of observations
This table summarises the number of banks in our sample for each country and the number of 
observations corresponding to each country for the sample period 2014Q2-2017Q4.
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Dependent variables
credit standards Change in the credit standards applied to new loans or credit lines. It equals 1 if easing, 0 if unchanged or tightening. 
average margins Change in the bank's loan margin (i.e., the spread over a relevant market reference rate) on average loans. It equals 1 if easing, 0 if unchanged or tightening. 
riskier margins Change in the bank's loan margin (i.e., the spread over a relevant market reference rate) on riskier loans. It equals 1 if easing, 0 if unchanged or tightening. 
Bank variables
size Logarithm of the bank's total assets.
capital ratio Capital and reserves over total assets (%)
liquidity ratio Cash + government securities + Eurosystem deposits over total assets (%)
log(loan-to-deposit ratio) Loans to non-financial corporations and households over deposits by non-financial corporations and households. In logs.
deposit ratio Deposits by households and non-financial corporations over total assets (%).
market share Ratio between a bank's outstanding loans and the total outstanding loans of the country's banking sector (%).  
legal form: foreign branch Dummy that equals 1 if the bank is a branch of a foreign bank. 
legal form: foreign subsidiary Dummy that equals 1 if the bank is a subsidiary of a foreign bank. 
legal form: head institution Dummy that equals 1 if the bank is the head institution of the banking group. 
legal form: national subsidiary Dummy that equals 1 if the bank is a subsidiary of a domestic bank. 
NDFR Dummy that equals 1 if the negative deposit facility rate contributed to a decrease in the bank's net interest income. 
competition (credit standards) Change in the factor "competition from other banks", as contributing to easing/tightening of credit standards. It equals 1 if it contributes to easing, 0 if unchanged or it contributes to tightening.
competition (terms & conditions) Change in the factor "pressure from competition", as contributing to easing/tightening of credit terms and conditions. It equals 1 if it contributes to easing, 0 if unchanged or it contributes to tightening.
Demand variables
demand nfc Change in the demand for loans or credit lines to non-financial corporations.
demand sme Change in the demand for loans or credit lines to small and medium enterprises. 
demand large Change in the demand for loans or credit lines to large firms. 
demand short term Change in the demand for short-term loans or credit lines to enterprises.
demand long term Change in the demand for long-term loans or credit lines to enterprises.
demand investment Change in the demand for loans or credit lines to enterprises for fixed investment. 
demand inventories Change in the demand for loans or credit lines to enterprises for inventories and working capital. 
demand mergers Change in the demand for loans or credit lines to enterprises for mergers/acquisitions and corporate restructuring. 
demand debt refinancing Change in the demand for loans or credit lines to enterprises for debt refinancing/restructuring and renegotiation. 
demand house purchase Change in the demand for loans to households for house purchase.
demand housing market prospects Change in the factor "housing market prospects", as contributing to lower/higher demand for loans to house purchase.
demand consumer confidence Change in the factor "consumer confidence", as contributing to lower/higher demand for loans to house purchase. 
Macro variables
sovereign bond 10-year sovereign bond.
IPI industrial production index.
unemployment rate unemployment rate.
CPI consumer price index.
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Computed with a sample of 323 banks from the euro area. Source: IBSI.
Table 2: Definition of variables
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Loans to NFCs
credit standards overall 1,695 0.05 0.22 0 1
credit standards sme 1,627 0.06 0.23 0 1
credit standards large 1,628 0.07 0.25 0 1
average margins 1,688 0.29 0.45 0 1
riskier margins 1,680 0.06 0.25 0 1
Loans to households for house purchase
credit standards 1,650 0.07 0.26 0 1
average margins 1,646 0.26 0.44 0 1
riskier margins 1,625 0.05 0.22 0 1
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables
This table contains the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables referred to credit standards and 
loan margins for the sample period 2014Q2-2017Q4. Credit standards and margins are dummies that 
equal 1 if easing/narrowing and 0 if no change or tightening/widening.
 BANCO DE ESPAÑA  36  DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1903 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Bank variables
bank TLTRO 1,775 0.80 1.08 0.00 4.96
country TLTRO 1,784 0.91 0.69 0.00 2.31
bank allowance 1,775 1.87 1.26 0.00 5.92
country allowance 1,784 1.46 0.67 0.00 3.00
size 1,776 10.68 1.54 2.77 13.88
capital ratio 1,772 10.68 5.98 0.25 100.00
liquidity ratio 1,776 8.36 6.41 0.00 34.24
log(loan-to-deposit ratio) 1,742 0.38 1.41 -1.60 10.00
deposit ratio 1,776 41.36 22.71 0.00 87.00
market share (loans to NFCs) 1,783 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.15
market share (loans for house purchase) 1,784 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.16
legal_form: foreign branch 1,784 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
legal_form: foreign subsidiary 1,784 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
legal_form: head institution 1,784 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
legal_form: national subsidiary 1,784 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
NDFR 1,784 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00
competition (credit standards) NFCs 1,667 0.13 0.34 0 1
competition (credit standards) housing loans 1,635 0.10 0.30 0 1
competition (terms & conditions) NFCs 1,324 0.26 0.44 0 1
competition (terms & conditions) housing loans 1,293 0.16 0.37 0 1
Macro variables
sovereign bond 1,649 1.06 0.78 -0.19 3.97
IPI 1,784 101.26 4.93 64.00 116.20
CPI 1,784 100.87 1.16 98.82 105.82
unemployment rate 1,784 8.86 4.55 3.56 24.45
HHI (loans to NFCs) 1,784 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.11
HHI (loans for house purchase) 1,784 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.11
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of bank characteristics and macro controls
This table contains the descriptive statistics of the bank characteristics that are used as key regressors, 
instrumental variables and control variables for the sample period 2014Q2-2017Q4.
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Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean Diff P-value
bank TLTRO 55 1.77 61 0 1.77 0.00
country TLTRO 55 1.06 61 0.82 0.24 0.06
bank allowance 55 2.04 61 1.90 0.14 0.56
country allowance 55 1.55 61 1.49 0.06 0.63
size 55 11.41 61 10.11 1.30 0.00
capital ratio 55 11.35 61 9.57 1.78 0.11
cds spread 49 99.08 34 81.22 17.86 0.04
npl ratio 49 9.76 58 7.18 2.58 0.16
liquidity ratio 55 8.94 61 5.59 3.35 0.00
log(loan-to-deposit ratio) 55 0.24 58 0.55 -0.31 0.19
deposit ratio 55 36.47 61 40.36 -3.88 0.35
market share (loans to NFCs) 55 0.04 61 0.01 0.02 0.00
market share (loans for house purchase) 55 0.03 61 0.02 0.01 0.13
legal form: foreign branch 55 0.02 61 0.05 -0.03 0.36
legal form: foreign subsidiary 55 0.29 61 0.13 0.16 0.03
legal form: head institution 55 0.56 61 0.44 0.12 0.19
legal form: national subsidiary 55 0.13 61 0.38 -0.25 0.00
NDFR 55 0.78 61 0.59 0.19 0.03
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of bank characteristics for participating and non-participating banks
This table contains the number of observations and means of bank characteristics for participating and non-participating 
banks in the TLTROs at the quarter of announcement (2014Q2). It also includes the difference in means between the two 
groups and the p-value associated with a two-sample t-test of equality of means. 
Participating banks Non-participating banks Difference in means
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
demand nfc: decreased 1,693 0.11 0.31 0 1
demand nfc: unchanged 1,693 0.65 0.48 0 1
demand nfc: increased 1,693 0.24 0.43 0 1
demand sme: decreased 1,628 0.12 0.33 0 1
demand sme: unchanged 1,628 0.65 0.48 0 1
demand sme: increased 1,628 0.23 0.42 0 1
demand large: decreased 1,625 0.11 0.31 0 1
demand large: unchanged 1,625 0.68 0.47 0 1
demand large: increased 1,625 0.22 0.41 0 1
demand short term: decreased 1,693 0.10 0.31 0 1
demand short term: unchanged 1,693 0.71 0.45 0 1
demand short term: increased 1,693 0.19 0.39 0 1
demand long term: decreased 1,693 0.09 0.29 0 1
demand long term: unchanged 1,693 0.64 0.48 0 1
demand long term: increased 1,693 0.27 0.44 0 1
demand investment: decreased 1,692 0.11 0.31 0 1
demand investment: unchanged 1,692 0.69 0.46 0 1
demand investment: increased 1,692 0.20 0.40 0 1
demand inventories: decreased 1,670 0.06 0.24 0 1
demand inventories: unchanged 1,670 0.76 0.43 0 1
demand inventories: increased 1,670 0.18 0.39 0 1
demand mergers: decreased 1,674 0.03 0.17 0 1
demand mergers: unchanged 1,674 0.85 0.36 0 1
demand mergers: increased 1,674 0.12 0.32 0 1
demand debt refinancing: decreased 1,686 0.03 0.16 0 1
demand debt refinancing: unchanged 1,686 0.85 0.36 0 1
demand debt refinancing: increased 1,686 0.12 0.33 0 1
Table 6a: Descriptive statistics of demand variables (loans to NFCs)
This table contains the descriptive statistics of the demand variables that are used as control 
variables for the sample period 2014Q2-2017Q4.
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
demand house purchase: decreased 1,649 0.09 0.29 0 1
demand house purchase: unchanged 1,649 0.54 0.50 0 1
demand house purchase: increased 1,649 0.36 0.48 0 1
demand housing market prospects: decreased 1,642 0.02 0.15 0 1
demand housing market prospects: unchanged 1,642 0.70 0.46 0 1
demand housing market prospects: increased 1,642 0.28 0.45 0 1
demand consumer confidence: decreased 1,642 0.01 0.11 0 1
demand consumer confidence: unchanged 1,642 0.76 0.43 0 1
demand consumer confidence: increased 1,642 0.23 0.42 0 1
Table 6b: Descriptive statistics of demand variables (loans for house purchase)
This table contains the descriptive statistics of the demand variables that are used as control variables 
for the sample period 2014Q2-2017Q4.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall credit standards sme credit standards large average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.113*** 0.076*** 0.155*** 0.082 0.013
(0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.061) (0.033)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,346 1,341 1,344 1,342 1,340
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall credit standards sme credit standards large average margins riskier margins
Bank TLTRO 0.011 0.019* 0.002 -0.009 -0.018**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.009)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Country-time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,484 1,479 1,482 1,480 1,478
Table 7a: country TLTROs and loans to NFCs (OLS)
This table shows the coefficient of the variable country TLTRO, estimated by OLS. The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 
(remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on country TLTRO and bank TLTRO plus macro controls, bank controls, demand controls 
and time fixed effects. Macro controls are the 10 year sovereign bond, the industrial production index, the unemployment rate, the consumer price 
index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, legal 
form and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by non-financial 
corporations in the following segments: all firms, SMEs and large firms, short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for 
inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt refinancing/restructuring. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 
2014 to the fourth quarter of 2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 7b: bank TLTROs and loans to NFCs (OLS)
This table shows the coefficient of the variable bank TLTRO, estimated by OLS. The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 
(remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on bank TLTRO plus bank controls, demand controls and country-time dummies. Bank 
controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, legal form and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy 
variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by non-financial corporations in the following segments: all firms, 
SMEs and large firms, short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and 
loans for debt refinancing/restructuring. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 to the fourth quarter of 2017. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered at bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE Bank TLTRO Country TLTRO Bank TLTRO 
Bank allowance 0.470*** 0.007 0.469***
(0.085) (0.014) (0.085)
Country allowance 0.100 0.577***
(0.170) (0.042)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES NO
Time dummies YES YES NO
Country-time dummies NO  NO YES
F-statistic 17.06 98.13 30.52
Sanderson-Windmeijer F-statistic 29.73 92.66 30.52
Stock-Yogo critical value (10% maximal IV size) 19.93 19.93 16.38
Observations 1,346 1,346 1,484
Table 8: first stage regressions
This table shows the coefficients on the instruments, bank allowance and country allowance, on first stage regressions. 
Equations (1) and (2) correspond to a regression with two endogenous variables, bank TLTRO and country TLTRO, and 
two instruments, bank allowance and country allowance. Equation (3) corresponds to a regression with one endogenous 
variable, bank TLTRO, and one instrument, bank allowance. The regressions include bank controls, demand controls, 
country controls, time fixed effects and country-time fixed effects as specified in the lower part of the table. Macro controls 
are the 10 year sovereign bond, the industrial production index, the unemployment rate, the consumer price index and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market 
share, legal form and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the 
demand of credit by non-financial corporations in the following segments: all firms, SMEs and large firms, short-term loans 
and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt 
refinancing/restructuring. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 to the fourth quarter of 2017. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall credit standards sme credit standards large average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.076*** 0.066** 0.126*** 0.046 -0.061*
(0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.075) (0.034)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,346 1,341 1,344 1,342 1,340
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall credit standards sme credit standards large riskier margins average margins
Bank TLTRO 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.002
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.033) (0.016)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Country-time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,484 1,479 1,482 1,480 1,478
Table 9a: country TLTROs and loans to NFCs (2SLS)
This table shows the coefficient of the variable country TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental variables are bank allowance and country 
allowance. The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 (remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on country TLTRO and bank 
TLTRO plus macro controls, bank controls, demand controls and time fixed effects. Macro controls are the 10 year sovereign bond, the industrial 
production index, the unemployment rate, the consumer price index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity 
ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, legal form and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, 
unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by non-financial corporations in the following segments: all firms, SMEs and large firms, short-term loans 
and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt refinancing/restructuring. 
The sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 to the fourth quarter of 2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank 
level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 9b: bank TLTROs and loans to NFCs (2SLS)
This table shows the coefficient of the variable bank TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental variable is bank allowance. The dependent 
variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 (remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on country TLTRO and bank TLTRO plus macro 
controls, bank controls, demand controls and time fixed effects. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, 
market share, legal form and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by 
non-financial corporations in the following segments: all firms, SMEs and large firms, short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, 
loans for inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt refinancing/restructuring. In addition, we use country-time fixed effects. The 
sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 to the fourth quarter of 2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at bank level. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.085*** 0.077 -0.034
(0.029) (0.052) (0.027)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES
Observations 1,176 1,173 1,156
(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall average margins riskier margins
Bank TLTRO 0.003 0.041* 0.016
(0.014) (0.021) (0.011)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country-time dummies YES YES YES
Observations 1,288 1,285 1,268
This table shows the coefficient of the variable country TLTRO, estimated by OLS.  The dependent 
variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 (remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on country 
TLTRO and bank TLTRO plus macro controls, bank controls, demand controls and time fixed effects. 
Macro controls are the 10 year sovereign bond, the industrial production index, the unemployment rate, the 
consumer price index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity 
ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, legal form and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy 
variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by households for house 
purchase and changes in the demand due to housing market prospects, consumer confidence, the general 
level of interest rates, debt refinancing and the regulatory and fiscal regime of housing markets. The sample 
period spans from the second quarter of 2014 to the fourth quarter of 2017. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively.
This table shows the coefficient of the variable bank TLTRO, estimated by OLS. The dependent variables 
take the values 1 (eased) and 0 (remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on country TLTRO 
and bank TLTRO plus macro controls, bank controls, demand controls and time fixed effects. Bank 
controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, legal form 
and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the 
demand of credit by households for house purchase and changes in the demand due to housing market 
prospects and consumer confidence. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 to the fourth 
quarter of 2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at bank level. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 10a: country TLTRO and loans for house purchase (OLS)
Table 10b: bank TLTROs and loans for house purchase (OLS)
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(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.126*** 0.155* -0.026
(0.035) (0.094) (0.036)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES
Observations 1,176 1,173 1,156
(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards average margins riskier margins
Bank TLTRO -0.026 0.146*** 0.042*
(0.018) (0.055) (0.022)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country-time dummies YES YES YES
Observations 1,288 1,285 1,268
This table shows the coefficient of the variable country TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental 
variables are bank allowance and country allowance.The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 
(remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on country TLTRO and bank TLTRO plus macro 
controls, bank controls, demand controls and time fixed effects. Macro controls are the 10 year sovereign 
bond, the industrial production index, the unemployment rate, the consumer price index and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, 
market share, legal form and NDFR.  Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, 
unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by households for house purchase and changes in the demand 
due to housing market prospects and consumer confidence. In addition, we use time fixed effects. The 
sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 to the fourth quarter of 2017. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered at the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
This table shows the coefficient of the variable bank TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental variable 
is bank allowance. The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 (remained unchanged or 
tightened) and are regressed on bank TLTRO plus bank controls, demand controls and country-time 
dummies. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market 
share, legal form and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, 
increase) in the demand of credit by households for house purchase and changes in the demand due to 
housing market prospects and consumer confidence. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 
2014 to the fourth quarter of 2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at bank level. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 11a: country TLTROs and loans for house purchase (2SLS)
Table 11b: bank TLTROs and loans for house purchase (2SLS)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall credit standards sme credit standards large average margins riskier margins
Participation 0.001 -0.005 0.009 0.012 -0.010
(0.059) (0.060) (0.064) (0.142) (0.067)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Country-time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,484 1,479 1,482 1,480 1,478
Sample: all banks.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall credit standards sme credit standards large average margins riskier margins
Bank TLTRO 0.019 0.029 0.072** 0.116** -0.004
(0.026) (0.026) (0.033) (0.047) (0.014)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Country-time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 767 764 766 767 766
Sample: banks that participated in the TLTROs. 
These tables show the coefficient of the variable participation (Table a) and bank TLTRO (Table b), estimated by 2SLS. The sample includes all 
banks in Table a) and banks that participated in the TLTROs in Table b). The instrumental variable is bank allowance. The dependent variables take 
the values 1 (easing) and 0 (remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on participation or bank TLTRO plus bank controls, demand 
controls and country-time fixed effects. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, legal form 
and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by non-financial 
corporations in the following segments: all firms, SMEs and large firms, short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for 
inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt refinancing/restructuring. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 
to the fourth quarter of 2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 12b:  bank TLTRO and loans to NFCs for participating banks (2SLS)
Table 12a: participation in the TLTROs and loans to NFCs (2SLS)
  
  BANCO DE ESPAÑA  45  DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1903 
(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards average margins riskier margins
Participation -0.109 0.617** 0.177
(0.084) (0.299) (0.114)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country-time dummies YES YES YES
Observations 1,288 1,285 1,268
Sample: all banks.
(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards average margins riskier margins
Bank TLTRO -0.033 0.166** 0.050*
(0.028) (0.067) (0.028)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country-time dummies YES YES YES
Observations 636 636 631
Sample: banks that participated in the TLTROs. 
These tables show the coefficient of the variable participation (Table a) and bank TLTRO (Table b), estimated by 
2SLS. The sample includes all banks in Table a) and banks that participated in the TLTROs in Table b). The 
instrumental variable is bank allowance. The dependent variables take the values 1 (easing) and 0 (remained 
unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on participation or bank TLTRO plus bank controls, demand controls 
and country-time fixed effects. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit 
ratio, market share, legal form and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, 
unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by households for house purchase and changes in the demand due to 
housing market prospects and consumer confidence. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 to 
the fourth quarter of 2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 13b: bank TLTROs and loans for house purchase for participating banks (2SLS)
Table 13a: participation in the TLTROs and loans for house purchase (2SLS)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall credit standards sme credit standards large average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.094*** 0.082*** 0.131*** 0.131* -0.024
(0.029) (0.030) (0.034) (0.073) (0.031)
Competition 0.086*** 0.080*** 0.088*** 0.376*** 0.095***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.034) (0.043) (0.023)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 966 962 964 965 964
Table 14: country TLTROs, competition and loans to NFCs (2SLS)
This table shows the coefficients of the variable country TLTRO and competition, estimated by 2SLS. Competition is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if the bank answers that competition contributed to an easing of terms and conditions in the past 3 months and 0 otherwise. The instrumental 
variables are bank allowance and country allowance. The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 (remained unchanged or tightened) 
and are regressed on country TLTRO and bank TLTRO plus macro controls, bank controls, demand controls and time fixed effects. Macro controls 
are the 10 year sovereign bond, the industrial production index, the unemployment rate, the consumer price index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, legal form and NDFR. Demand controls 
are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by non-financial corporations in the following segments: 
all firms, SMEs and large firms, short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for inventories, loans for mergers and 
acquisitions and loans for debt refinancing/restructuring. The sample period spans from the first quarter of 2015 to the fourth quarter of 2017. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.106*** 0.138* -0.050
(0.036) (0.075) (0.042)
Competition 0.168*** 0.180*** 0.061**
(0.039) (0.046) (0.025)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES
Observations 1,176 1,173 1,156
Table 15: country TLTROs, competition and loans for house purchase (2SLS)
This table shows the coefficients of the variables country TLTRO and competition, estimated by 2SLS. 
Competition is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank answers that competition contributed to an easing 
of terms and conditions in the past 3 months and 0 otherwise. The instrumental variables are bank 
allowance and country allowance. The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 (remained 
unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on country TLTRO and bank TLTRO plus macro controls, 
bank controls, demand controls and time fixed effects. Macro controls are the 10 year sovereign bond, the 
industrial production index, the unemployment rate, the consumer price index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, 
legal form and NDFR.  Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, 
increase) in the demand of credit by households for house purchase and changes in the demand due to 
housing market prospects and consumer confidence. In addition, we use time fixed effects. The sample 
period spans from the first quarter of 2015 to the fourth quarter of 2017. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall credit standards sme credit standards large average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.304*** 0.399*** 0.539*** -0.152 -0.268**
(0.098) (0.116) (0.141) (0.103) (0.136)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 267 266 266 267 267
Sample: observations for which the variable competition equals 1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall credit standards sme credit standards large riskier margins average margins
Country TLTRO 0.023 -0.005 0.044* 0.121* -0.014
(0.025) (0.014) (0.025) (0.071) (0.013)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 783 779 782 783 782
Sample: observations for which the variable competition equals 0. 
These tables show the coefficient of the variable country TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental variables are bank allowance and country 
allowance. The dependent variables take the values 1 (easing) and 0 (remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on country TLTRO and 
bank TLTRO plus macro controls, bank controls, demand controls and time fixed effects. Macro controls are the 10 year sovereign bond, the 
industrial production index, the unemployment rate, the consumer price index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Bank controls are size, capital 
ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, legal form and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes 
(decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by non-financial corporations in the following segments: all firms, SMEs and large firms, 
short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt 
refinancing/restructuring. The sample period spans from the first quarter of 2015 to the fourth quarter of 2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Panel A and B contain the 
observations for which the variable competition equals 1 and 0, respectively. Competition is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank answers that 
competition contributed to an easing of terms and conditions in the past 3 months and 0 otherwise.
Table 16a: country TLTROs and loans to NFCs (2SLS): high competitive pressures
Table 16b:  country TLTROs and loans to NFCs (2SLS): low competitive pressures
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(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.520*** 0.219 -0.215*
(0.179) (0.163) (0.113)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES
Observations 129 129 129
Sample: observations for which the variable competition equals 1. 
(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.075** 0.054 -0.035
(0.035) (0.074) (0.038)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES
Observations 739 737 731
Sample: observations for which the variable competition equals 0. 
These tables show the coefficient of the variable country TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental variables are 
bank allowance and country allowance.The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 (remained unchanged 
or tightened) and are regressed on country TLTRO and bank TLTRO plus macro controls, bank controls, demand 
controls and time fixed effects. Macro controls are the 10 year sovereign bond, the industrial production index, the 
unemployment rate, the consumer price index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Bank controls are size, capital 
ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, legal form and NDFR.  Demand controls are 
dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by households for house 
purchase and changes in the demand due to housing market prospects and consumer confidence. In addition, we use 
time fixed effects. The sample period spans from the first quarter of 2015 to the fourth quarter of 2017. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Panel A and B contain the observations for which the variable competition 
equals 1 and 0, respectively. Competition is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank answers that competition 
contributed to an easing of terms and conditions in the past 3 months and 0 otherwise.
Table 17a: country TLTROs and loans for house purchase (2SLS): high competitive pressures
Table 17b: country TLTROs and loans for house purchase (2SLS): low competitive pressures
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall credit standards sme credit standards large average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.209*** 0.201*** 0.146** -0.017 -0.122*
(0.072) (0.074) (0.060) (0.131) (0.068)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 603 602 602 599 598
Sample: banks with market share below the median (1.1%).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall credit standards sme credit standards large riskier margins average margins
Country TLTRO 0.034 0.031 0.119*** 0.101 -0.074
(0.037) (0.032) (0.044) (0.090) (0.052)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 743 739 742 743 742
Sample: banks with market share above the median (1.1%).
These tables show the coefficient of the variable country TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental variables are bank allowance and country 
allowance. The dependent variables take the values 1 (easing) and 0 (remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on country TLTRO and 
bank TLTRO plus macro controls, bank controls, demand controls and time fixed effects. Macro controls are the 10 year sovereign bond, the 
industrial production index, the unemployment rate, the consumer price index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Bank controls are size, capital 
ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, legal form and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes 
(decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by non-financial corporations in the following segments: all firms, SMEs and large firms, 
short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt 
refinancing/restructuring. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 to the fourth quarter of 2017. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 18a: country TLTROs and loans to NFCs (2SLS): banks with low market share 
Table 18b: country TLTROs and loans to NFCs (2SLS): banks with high market share 
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(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.257*** 0.186* -0.127**
(0.061) (0.103) (0.049)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES
Observations 594 593 576
Sample: banks with market share below the median (1.3%).
(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.100* 0.059 -0.017
(0.056) (0.118) (0.049)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES
Observations 582 580 580
Sample: banks with market share above the median (1.3%).
These tables show the coefficient of the variable country TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental variables 
are bank allowance and country allowance.The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 (remained 
unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on country TLTRO and bank TLTRO plus macro controls, bank 
controls, demand controls and time fixed effects. Macro controls are the 10 year sovereign bond, the industrial 
production index, the unemployment rate, the consumer price index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Bank 
controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, legal form and NDFR.  
Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by 
households for house purchase and changes in the demand due to housing market prospects and consumer 
confidence. In addition, we use time fixed effects. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 to the 
fourth quarter of 2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 19a: country TLTROs and loans for house purchase (2SLS): banks with low market share
Table 19b: country TLTROs and loans for house purchase (2SLS): banks with high market share
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall credit standards sme credit standards large average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO -0.017 -0.043*** -0.003 -0.059* -0.039*
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.031) (0.024)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,242 1,239 1,238 1,240 1,229
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall credit standards sme credit standards large riskier margins average margins
Bank TLTRO -0.017* -0.009 -0.013 -0.023 -0.008
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.022) (0.015)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Country-time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,390 1,387 1,386 1,388 1,377
Table 20a: country TLTROs and loans to NFCs (placebo period)
This table shows the coefficient of the variable country TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental variables are bank allowance and country 
allowance. The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 (remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on country TLTRO and 
bank TLTRO plus macro controls, bank controls, demand controls and time fixed effects. Macro controls are the 10 year sovereign bond, the 
industrial production index, the unemployment rate, the consumer price index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Bank controls are size, capital 
ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, legal form and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes 
(decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by non-financial corporations in the following segments: all firms, SMEs and large firms, 
short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt 
refinancing/restructuring. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 2010 to the first quarter of 2014. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 20b: bank TLTROs and loans to NFCs (placebo period)
This table shows the coefficient of the variable bank TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental variable is bank allowance. The dependent 
variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 (remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on country TLTRO and bank TLTRO plus macro 
controls, bank controls, demand controls and time fixed effects. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, 
market share, legal form and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit 
by non-financial corporations in the following segments: all firms, SMEs and large firms, short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed 
investment, loans for inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt refinancing/restructuring. In addition, we use country-time 
fixed effects. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 2010 to the first quarter of 2014. Robust standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.023 -0.085*** -0.026
(0.018) (0.031) (0.017)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES
Observations 1,027 1,026 1,014
(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards average margins riskier margins
Bank TLTRO 0.029 0.022 -0.014
(0.023) (0.028) (0.026)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country-time dummies YES YES YES
Observations 1,138 1,137 1,125
Table 21a: country TLTROs and loans for house purchase (placebo period)
This table shows the coefficient of the variable country TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental 
variables are bank allowance and country allowance.The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) 
and 0 (remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on country TLTRO and bank TLTRO plus 
macro controls, bank controls, demand controls and time fixed effects. Macro controls are the 10 year 
sovereign bond, the industrial production index, the unemployment rate, the consumer price index and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, 
deposit ratio, market share, legal form and NDFR.  Demand controls are dummy variables for changes 
(decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by households for house purchase and changes in 
the demand due to housing market prospects and consumer confidence. In addition, we use time fixed 
effects. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 2010 to the first quarter of 2014. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 21b: bank TLTROs and loans for house purchase (placebo period)
This table shows the coefficient of the variable bank TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental 
variable is bank allowance. The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 (remained unchanged 
or tightened) and are regressed on bank TLTRO plus bank controls, demand controls and country-time 
dummies. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market 
share, legal form and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, 
increase) in the demand of credit by households for house purchase and changes in the demand due to 
housing market prospects and consumer confidence. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 
2010 to the first quarter of 2014. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at bank level. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall credit standards sme credit standards large average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.098** 0.097** 0.150*** -0.069 -0.124**
(0.042) (0.044) (0.045) (0.087) (0.049)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 714 712 714 710 708
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall credit standards sme credit standards large riskier margins average margins
Bank TLTRO -0.009 -0.013 -0.026 -0.008 0.003
(0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.034) (0.022)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Country-time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 791 789 791 787 785
Table 22a: country TLTROs and loans to NFCs (shorter period)
This table shows the coefficient of the variable country TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental variables are bank allowance and country 
allowance. The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 (remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on country TLTRO and 
bank TLTRO plus macro controls, bank controls, demand controls and time fixed effects. Macro controls are the 10 year sovereign bond, the 
industrial production index, the unemployment rate, the consumer price index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Bank controls are size, capital 
ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, legal form and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes 
(decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by non-financial corporations in the following segments: all firms, SMEs and large firms, 
short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt 
refinancing/restructuring. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 to the first quarter of 2016. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 22b: bank TLTROs and loans to NFCs (shorter period)
This table shows the coefficient of the variable bank TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental variable is bank allowance. The dependent 
variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 (remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on country TLTRO and bank TLTRO plus macro 
controls, bank controls, demand controls and time fixed effects. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit 
ratio, market share, legal form and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of 
credit by non-financial corporations in the following segments: all firms, SMEs and large firms, short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed 
investment, loans for inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt refinancing/restructuring. In addition, we use country-time 
fixed effects. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 to the first quarter of 2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.157*** 0.169 -0.011
(0.057) (0.131) (0.048)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES
Observations 580 579 571
(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards average margins riskier margins
Bank TLTRO -0.021 0.182*** 0.022
(0.025) (0.066) (0.025)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country-time dummies YES YES YES
Observations 639 638 630
Table 23a: country TLTROs and loans for house purchase  (shorter period)
This table shows the coefficient of the variable country TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental 
variables are bank allowance and country allowance.The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 
(remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on country TLTRO and bank TLTRO plus macro 
controls, bank controls, demand controls and time fixed effects. Macro controls are the 10 year sovereign 
bond, the industrial production index, the unemployment rate, the consumer price index and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, 
market share, legal form and NDFR.  Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, 
unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by households for house purchase and changes in the demand 
due to housing market prospects and consumer confidence. In addition, we use time fixed effects. The 
sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 to the first quarter of 2016. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 23b: bank TLTROs and loans for house purchase  (shorter period)
This table shows the coefficient of the variable bank TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental variable 
is bank allowance. The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 (remained unchanged or 
tightened) and are regressed on bank TLTRO plus bank controls, demand controls and country-time 
dummies. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, 
legal form and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in 
the demand of credit by households for house purchase and changes in the demand due to housing market 
prospects and consumer confidence. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 to the first 
quarter of 2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at bank level. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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(1) (2)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit growth credit growth
(loans to NFCs) (loans for house purchase)
Country TLTRO 1.157** 1.205***
(0.476) (0.426)
Bank Controls YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES
Country Controls YES YES
Time dummies YES YES
Observations 710 774
(1) (2)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit growth credit growth
(loans to NFCs) (loans for house purchase)
Bank TLTRO -0.276 -0.398
(0.298) (0.279)
Bank Controls YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES
Country-time dummies YES YES
Observations 787 851
Table 24a: country TLTROs and credit growth (shorter period)
This table shows the coefficient of the variable country TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental 
variables are bank allowance and country allowance. The dependent variables are the quarterly growth 
rates of loans to NFCs (column 1) and loans for house purchase (column 2). They are regressed on 
country TLTRO and bank TLTRO plus macro controls, bank controls, demand controls and time fixed 
effects. Macro controls are the 10 year sovereign bond, the industrial production index, the 
unemployment rate, the consumer price index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Bank controls are 
size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, legal form and NDFR. 
In the case of loans to NFCs, demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, 
increase) in the demand of credit by non-financial corporations in the following segments: all firms, 
SMEs and large firms, short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for 
inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt refinancing/restructuring. In the case 
of loans for house purchase, demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, 
increase) in the demand of credit by households for house purchase and changes in the demand due to 
housing market prospects and consumer confidence. The sample period spans from the second quarter 
of 2014 to the first quarter of 2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank 
level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 24b: bank TLTROs and credit growth (shorter period)
This table shows the coefficient of the variable bank TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental 
variable is bank allowance. The dependent variables are the quarterly growth rates of loans to NFCs 
(column 1) and loans for house purchase (column 2). They are regressed on bank TLTRO plus bank 
controls, demand controls and country-time dummies. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, 
loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, legal form and NDFR. In the case of loans to NFCs, 
demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of 
credit by non-financial corporations in the following segments: all firms, SMEs and large firms, short-
term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for inventories, loans for mergers and 
acquisitions and loans for debt refinancing/restructuring.  In the case of loans for house purchase, 
demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of 
credit by households for house purchase and changes in the demand due to housing market prospects 
and consumer confidence. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 to the first quarter 
of 2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at bank level. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall credit standards sme credit standards large average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.085*** 0.079*** 0.138*** 0.064 -0.055*
(0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.077) (0.034)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,245 1,240 1,243 1,241 1,239
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall credit standards sme credit standards large average margins riskier margins
Bank TLTRO -0.004 -0.008 -0.005 -0.017 -0.012
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.034) (0.018)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Country-time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,383 1,378 1,381 1,379 1,377
Table 25a: country TLTROs and loans to NFCs (sample without G-SIBs)
This table shows the coefficient of the variable country TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 
(remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on country TLTRO and bank TLTRO plus macro controls, bank controls, demand controls and 
time fixed effects. Macro controls are the 10 year sovereign bond, the industrial production index, the unemployment rate, the consumer price index 
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, legal form 
and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by non-financial 
corporations in the following segments: all firms, SMEs and large firms, short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for 
inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt refinancing/restructuring. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 
to the fourth quarter of 2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 25b: bank TLTROs and loans to NFCs (sample without G-SIBs)
This table shows the coefficient of the variable bank TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 
(remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on bank TLTRO plus bank controls, demand controls and country-time dummies. Bank 
controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, legal form and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy 
variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by non-financial corporations in the following segments: all firms, 
SMEs and large firms, short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for inventories, loans for mergers and acquisitions and 
loans for debt refinancing/restructuring. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 to the fourth quarter of 2017. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered at bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.139*** 0.163* -0.031
(0.035) (0.098) (0.039)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES
Observations 1,093 1,090 1,073
(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards average margins riskier margins
Bank TLTRO -0.040* 0.126** 0.040
(0.023) (0.057) (0.027)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country-time dummies YES YES YES
Observations 1,205 1,202 1,185
Table 26a: country TLTROs and loans for house purchase (sample without G-SIBs)
This table shows the coefficient of the variable country TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental 
variables are bank allowance and country allowance.The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) and 
0 (remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on country TLTRO and bank TLTRO plus macro 
controls, bank controls, demand controls and time fixed effects. Macro controls are the 10 year sovereign 
bond, the industrial production index, the unemployment rate, the consumer price index and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, 
market share, legal form and NDFR.  Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, 
unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by households for house purchase and changes in the demand 
due to housing market prospects and consumer confidence. In addition, we use time fixed effects. The 
sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 to the fourth quarter of 2017. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 26b: bank TLTROs and loans for house purchase (sample without G-SIBs)
This table shows the coefficient of the variable bank TLTRO, estimated by 2SLS. The instrumental 
variable is bank allowance. The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 (remained unchanged 
or tightened) and are regressed on bank TLTRO plus bank controls, demand controls and country-time 
dummies. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market 
share, legal form and NDFR. Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, 
increase) in the demand of credit by households for house purchase and changes in the demand due to 
housing market prospects and consumer confidence. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 
2014 to the fourth quarter of 2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at bank level. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Figure 1: distribution of TLTRO uptake over borrowing allowance (%) for banks 
participating in the initial TLROs 
 
 
Figure 2: proportion of banks that eased credit standards/margins for high and low values of 
country TLTRO (loans to NFCs) 
 
The figure displays the mean of the dependent variables (loans to NFCs) for two groups. A bank 
belongs to the group “high country TLTRO” if the value of the variable country TLTRO(i)c is higher than the 
median (0.75); otherwise it belongs to the group “low country TLTRO”.  
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Figure 3: proportion of banks that eased credit standards/margins for high and low values of 
bank TLTRO (loans to NFCs) 
 
The figure displays the mean of the dependent variables (loans to NFCs) for two groups. A bank 
belongs to the group “high bank TLTRO” if the value of the variable bank TLTROi is higher than the 
median (0); otherwise it belongs to the group “low bank TLTRO”.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall credit standards sme credit standards large average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.113*** 0.072*** 0.157*** 0.065 -0.002
(0.026) (0.025) (0.030) (0.057) (0.026)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,137 1,134 1,315 1,342 1,340
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards overall credit standards sme credit standards large average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.196*** 0.097*** 0.160*** 0.061 0.053*
(0.036) (0.034) (0.040) (0.078) (0.027)
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,137 1,134 1,315 1,342 1,340
Table A1: country TLTROs and loans to NFCs (Probit)
These tables show the average marginal effect of the variable country TLTRO, estimated by probit (table A1) and IV probit (table A2). The 
instrumental variables are bank allowance and country allowance. The dependent variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 (remained unchanged 
or tightened) and are regressed on country TLTRO and bank TLTRO plus macro controls, bank controls, demand controls and time fixed effects. 
Macro controls are the 10 year sovereign bond, the industrial production index, the unemployment rate, the consumer price index and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, legal form and NDFR. 
Demand controls are dummy variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by non-financial corporations in the 
following segments: all firms, SMEs and large firms, short-term loans and long-term loans, loans for fixed investment, loans for inventories, loans for 
mergers and acquisitions and loans for debt refinancing/restructuring. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 to the fourth 
quarter of 2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table A2: country TLTROs and loans to NFCs (IV Probit)
   SUPPLEMENT: ESTIMATES OF INDIRECT EFFECTS WITH PROBIT AND IV PROBIT 
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(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.095*** 0.063 -0.039
(0.028) (0.054) (0.027)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES
Observations 1,158 1,173 1,156
(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE credit standards average margins riskier margins
Country TLTRO 0.024 -0.117 -0.068**
(0.038) (0.097) (0.033)
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Demand Controls YES YES YES
Country Controls YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES
Observations 1,158 1,173 1,156
Table A3: country TLTROs and loans for house purchase (Probit)
Table A4: country TLTROs and loans for house purchase (IV Probit)
This table shows the coefficient of the variable country TLTRO, estimated by probit (table A1) and IV 
probit (table A2). The instrumental variables are bank allowance and country allowance.The dependent 
variables take the values 1 (eased) and 0 (remained unchanged or tightened) and are regressed on country 
TLTRO and bank TLTRO plus macro controls, bank controls, demand controls and time fixed effects. 
Macro controls are the 10 year sovereign bond, the industrial production index, the unemployment rate, the 
consumer price index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Bank controls are size, capital ratio, liquidity 
ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, deposit ratio, market share, legal form and NDFR.  Demand controls are dummy 
variables for changes (decrease, unchanged, increase) in the demand of credit by households for house 
purchase and changes in the demand due to housing market prospects and consumer confidence. In 
addition, we use time fixed effects. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 2014 to the fourth 
quarter of 2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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